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ABSTRACT 
 Terrorist groups in the Middle East continue to pose a challenge to U.S. interests 
and a threat to the security of the United States and its allies. It is important to understand 
what factors drive the behavior of these groups and how they adapt to certain challenges. 
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a unique terrorist organization that has 
had an indelible impact on the Middle East and continues to pose a threat to U.S. 
interests. Examining ISIS’s behavior and development over time will help illuminate how 
certain types of decisions are made in a terrorist organization, what consistencies are 
present in decision-making, what motivates the behavior of terrorist groups in conflict, 
and when or why an organization might modify or amend its doctrine to adapt to certain 
challenges. In the case of ISIS, how the group has adapted or remained consistent in its 
use and reliance on violence, local support, and apocalyptic ideology is examined. 
Examining those areas of ISIS’s behavior over time help illuminate if and under what 
conditions the group has been compelled to alter its approach. Findings help us 
understand what (if any) factors have forced the organization to shift its behavior over 
time in order to help it advance its stated ultimate goal of a restructured united, global 
Muslim society ruled by a purely Islamic state system, unadulterated by non-Islamic 
ideas, morals, or legal concepts. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Terrorist groups in the Middle East continue to pose a challenge to U.S. interests 
and a threat to the security of the United States and its allies. It is important to understand 
what factors drive the behavior of these groups and how they adapt to certain challenges. 
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a unique terrorist organization that has had 
an indelible impact on the Middle East and continues to pose a threat to U.S. interests. 
Examining ISIS’s behavior and development over time will help illuminate how certain 
types of decisions are made in a terrorist organization, what consistencies are present in 
decision-making, what motivates the behavior of terrorist groups in conflict, and when or 
why an organization might modify or amend its doctrine to adapt to certain challenges. In 
the case of ISIS, how the group has adapted or remained consistent in its use and reliance 
on violence, local support, and apocalyptic ideology is examined. Examining those areas 
of ISIS’s behavior over time will help illuminate if and under what conditions the group 
has been compelled to alter its approach over time. Findings will help us understand what 
(if any) factors have forced the organization to shift its behavior over time in order to help 
it advance its stated ultimate goal of a restructured united, global Muslim society ruled by 
a purely Islamic state system, unadulterated by non-Islamic ideas, morals, or legal 
concepts.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will strive to identify the factors that most influence the behavior and 
decision-making of terrorist organizations, and the challenges that compel ideological and/
or behavioral change. The general study of terrorism and terrorist organizations has become 
an increasingly important topic in academia, yet the behavior of terrorist groups remains 
an under-studied issue. ISIS is a unique case because its actions and decisions have 
sometimes been in contradiction to those of more typical terrorist organizations. It has also 
been among most successful terrorist groups in terms of territorial expansion, grass-roots 
international support, and brand recognition. An analysis of ISIS’s behavior and actions 
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over its history will provide better insight into what factors drive the organization, as well 
as help identify when the group has been willing to make compromises. While ISIS may 
eventually deteriorate as an organization, its overarching ideological goals are likely to 
continue to attract adherents and supporters, and therefore similar types of organizations 
are also likely to continue to exist. 
Understanding how terrorist organizations behave is not only an academic goal, it 
also has important implications for U.S. national security strategy and foreign military 
operations. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. seeks to prevent any 
potential threats to national security such as attacks to the homeland as well as any threat 
to U.S. interests in the Middle Eastern region to include U.S. allies, resources, military 
personnel, as well as U.S. citizens abroad. The United States continues to combat present 
terrorist organizations and strives to deter future organizations from developing and 
evolving. As the U.S. supports its allies and partners in the region, these organizations—
including ISIS—seek to undermine the authority and legitimacy of those partnered 
governments. ISIS remains one of the most credible threats impacting the stability of the 
region and has spread beyond the region to affect overall global security to the region, to 
U.S. interests in the region, as well as overall global security, which suggests that further 
understanding of this organization is a vital interest. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to David Rapoport, literature on terrorism is abundant but unevenly 
distributed. He finds that more attention has been focused on the motivations of terrorist 
groups whereas there has been relatively little attention paid to the study of internal 
organizational dynamics, especially decision-making and other issues such as 
counterterrorism policy.1 The question of what motivations drive terrorist group behavior 
is a foundational part of the broader literature on terrorism. For example, Martha 
Crenshaw’s ‘instrumental model’ posits that terrorist organizations with a clear political 
                                                 
1 David C. Rapoport, ed. Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 1. 
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goal operate in a calculated way to manage costs and rewards of organizational strikes.2 In 
this approach, violence (or terrorism) is used as a “means to a political end” that is, to 
“produce a change in the government’s political position” whereby an organization’s 
success is determined by their ability to reach their political end state.3 While this model 
is simple and easy to understand, it would imply that these groups act primarily on logical 
thinking. This argument can easily be contradicted, as many terrorist organizations have 
been known to go against conventional wisdom and logic by making decisions that would 
seem to be detrimental and costly to the organization, but are somehow supported by its 
ideology and its overall objective. Crenshaw also discusses an organizational model in 
which decision-making is determined by its own internal struggles and desires rather than 
solely the broader political objective.4 “Terrorist behavior represents the outcome of the 
internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic action.”5 
Similar to Crenshaw’s organizational model, Jacob Shapiro analyzes a variety of 
terrorist organizations and maintains that they contain a number of same types of internal 
dilemmas which are inescapable and can impact the decision-making of the organization.6 
This includes issues of bureaucracy, leadership delegation, preference divergence among 
leaders, and keeping tactics in line with strategy.7 Shapiro describes a variety of terrorist 
groups throughout the 19th-21st centuries which look very similar from an organizational 
perspective throughout different regions including Europe and the Middle East.8 Most 
terrorist groups struggle with internal organizational issues involving the right way to 
manage their people, and many employ the same set of standard managerial tools as any 
                                                 
2  Rapoport. 2. 
3 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” in Inside 
Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 13–15.  
4 Crenshaw, 3. 
5 Crenshaw, 19. 
6 Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: 




other organization.9 According to Shapiro, the key to understanding these groups is 
recognizing their “fundamental organizational dilemma” which is how to manage 
organizational resources efficiently and be precise in their control as well as their 
application of violence.10  
Shapiro argues that this dilemma is nearly inescapable and discusses the challenge 
of hierarchy and leadership control that is present across different groups. This includes 
the struggle of delegating duties to a lower leadership level which comes with tradeoffs of 
security-control and security-efficiency.11 These organizations must precisely control 
violence as well as efficiently manage money, however the challenges in trying to achieve 
this impedes these organization from achieving their objective.12 
Shapiro discusses the issues of preference divergence between key principle leaders 
and low-level leaders and the difficulties it creates in target selection and management of 
resources.13 The literature does not go further to articulate this impact in terms of political 
decision-making in terms of the organization’s overall strategic goals; however, this was 
beyond the scope of what the book was attempting to accomplish. While this evidence is 
valid in defining the limitations of terrorist organizations, and begins to touch on 
organizations’ difficulties with tradeoffs and the struggle with compromising control or 
efficiency in order to achieve a particular political objective. This research will seek to 
focus on ISIS and its willingness to compromise or balance certain things within the 
organization in order to achieve its objective.  
Although there is a broad literature on terrorism and terrorist groups, scholarship 
on ISIS is more limited. Currently, there are only a few studies that directly discuss or 
analyze ISIS’s behavior and decision-making.14 Some studies examine how terrorist 
                                                 
9 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma. 
10 Shapiro, 249. 
11 Shapiro. 
12 Shapiro, 250. 
13 Shapiro. 
14 For the purposes of this research, when referring to the ultimate goal or objective of ISIS, the terms 
“caliphate” and “ultraconservative Islamic State” may be used interchangeably. 
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organizations more broadly behave, but very little literature examines the willingness of 
ISIS to modify its use of violence, attempts to gain local support, and its fulfillment of 
apocalyptic prophecies in order to achieve its objective of an ultraconservative Islamic 
State. This thesis will seek to fill the gap in the existing literature by examining consistency 
and shifts in ISIS’s behavior in the three aforementioned areas. 
There is a vast amount of research defining ISIS as an organization, as a terrorist 
group, as an insurgency, and even as a quasi-state, however little has been focused 
specifically on ISIS as a means to understand its behavior, how this organization differs 
from other organizations in decision-making, or even what compromises the organization 
is willing to make, if any, to achieve its ultimate objective. The majority of the literature 
written on ISIS explores the organization through thematic (rather than theoretical) lenses. 
This includes examinations of the group’s type, evolution, ideology, and goals and strategy. 
Additional literature describes the evolution of ISIS in phases including how the 
organization and key leaders emerged, and the type of ideology and prophecies that they 
sought to fulfill. This thesis will explore three main themes which have emerged in the 
burgeoning study of the organization: its apocalyptic worldview, its political evolution, and 
its contentious typological categorization.  
1. Islamic Apocalypticism 
Central to ISIS ideology and perhaps a potential driver of its behavior has been the 
group’s avowed belief in Islamic apocalyptic expectations. Will McCants, for example, has 
drawn on a number of primary sources such as religious texts and rarely seen letters from 
al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to demonstrate how ISIS’s apocalyptic prophecy has shaped 
its past and what it implies for its future.15 McCants discusses how apocalyptic messaging 
played a large part of the Islamic State’s propaganda and its ability to gain widespread 
support, sympathizers, and recruits from across the globe.16 This is relevant to this thesis 
in an attempt to understand the organization’s behavior and decision-making as it relates 
                                                 
15 William Faizi McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 
16 McCants. 
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to its apocalyptic beliefs. This literature does not discuss how much apocalypticism directly 
influences the behavior of the organization as a whole or by influencing principle leaders 
in the organization, or even if certain aspects of this ideology are not always followed or 
fail to hold true, which is part of the gap this research will seek to fill. 
Graeme Wood concurs with McCants in his popular article “What ISIS Really 
Wants” in terms of how the apocalyptic ideology ties into ISIS’s ultimate goal of 
establishing the caliphate and its importance in the organization’s journey toward reaching 
this objective.17 This is crucial to understanding the organization’s ultimate goal and how 
it justifies its actions based on these principles, but it does not address specific instances in 
which the organization’s apocalyptic ideology has influenced its decisions in order to reach 
these objectives. 
Wood also discusses the organization’s desire to create a complete society and 
emphasizes the importance of the re-instating the caliphate as a “vehicle for salvation” not 
just a “political entity.”18 Wood describes their beliefs in apocalyptic “end of days” 
ideology as well as the “ideological purity” of the organization which makes it predictable 
and can be useful in attempting to understand its decision-making.19  
2. The Evolution of ISIS 
The evolution of ISIS has been written about in a historical context that breaks its 
evolution into stages or phases and describes how events within each of those phases have 
influenced its progression. Brian Fishman dissects the seven-stage “Master Plan” strategy 
document as written by a senior al-Qaeda leader living under house arrest in Iran.20 This 
strategy document is used as a map or blueprint to understand how the declaration of an 
                                                 




20 Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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Islamic State is to be achieved.21 Fishman analyzes this strategic document by providing 
a “history of people and the strategic and operational decisions they made to create the 
Islamic State.”22 Fishman emphasizes the ideology of Zarqawiism as a “distinct strain of 
jihadi thought” that was one of the key factors involved in how the organization continued 
to evolve, which is not discussed in most literature.23 This account covers the history of 
the Islamic State broken into seven stages of evolution from the very beginning and 
provides an outlook for what the future of the organization may look like, providing context 
for future ISIS plans in its overall master plan or grand strategy. This type of literature is 
important in understanding the historical context of the organization, the emergence of 
important leaders, the ideology of Zarqawiism and the use of violence associated with this 
type of thinking. This literature, however, does not analyze the behavioral patterns of the 
organization or discuss how these key leaders weighed certain decisions or made 
compromises in its own doctrine in order to meet its objective. 
The work of Craig Whiteside discusses the evolution of ISIS in phases and provides 
an interpretation of ISIS as “a revolutionary group that has adopted Mao’s protracted 
warfare to establish an expansive caliphate… [through] its adoption of the doctrine of 
revolutionary warfare.”24 Analyzing this organization from a ‘Maoist lens’ is useful in 
understanding some of the driving principles of the organization and making predictions 
about how ISIS may react to future challenges and how it may prioritize certain elements 
in order to achieve its ultimate objective.  
According to Whiteside, this organization has evolved through the use of Maoist 
principles of revolutionary warfare as well as influences from previous Salafi-militant 
experiences and publications, which have been adopted as doctrine and executed at the 
operational level.25 Whiteside claims that the Islamic State has evolved through phases 
                                                 
21 Fishman, The Master Plan. 
22 Fishman, xi. 
23 Fishman, 17–18. 
24 Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-
2016),” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 4 (August 2016):6. 
25 Whiteside, 6. 
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starting with Phase I—the ‘building’ phase— in which ISIS built up its network of 
ideological fighters in Iraq and capitalized on the chaos that ensued after the U.S. 2003 
invasion of Iraq and the abolishment of the Iraqi government.26 Once the organization built 
up its network of fighters, it proceeded to move into Phase II of ‘expansion’ in which this 
network expanded by building a large organization with a strong bureaucracy that allowed 
for continuous support of its operations.27 However, due to the amount of tribal backlash, 
the Islamic State reverted back to Phase I.28 This sequence of events demonstrates the 
importance of local support as well as the implications of failing to achieve local tribal 
support. This situation would suggest that as ISIS seeks further growth, support from local 
tribes and the local population will be an important factor in its decision-making—similar 
to Maoist principles of guerilla warfare and success of an insurgency.  
An important aspect of ISIS’s ability to continue evolving through these phases was 
the “political dysfunction” in Iraq and their leveraging of sectarianism to provoke violence 
in the region to return to Phase II.29 As the Islamic State continues its expansion, it moves 
into Phase III; ‘preserving’ which builds upon Phase II in securing supplies, money, 
recruitment of foreign fighters, beginning of “decisive campaigns” and establishing the 
political and environmental conditions necessary to reach their ultimate goal of establishing 
the caliphate.30 This research demonstrates the progression of the organization over time 
and the necessary ingredients that either allowed for or prevented this group from 
progressing to the next phase. Understanding these aspects of the organization provides 
insight as to what underlying principles are important to the overall strategy of the 
organization. Whiteside’s research has shown why these elements are important to the 
evolution of the organization as a whole and are likely relevant factors in how key leaders 
prioritize certain elements of its strategy –to include the way in which the strategy is carried 
out. 
                                                 
26 Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare,” 6. 
27 Whiteside, 6. 
28 Whiteside, 6. 
29 Whiteside, 6. 
30 Whiteside, 9. 
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3. Defining ISIS 
There is an exhaustive amount of literature that seeks to define ISIS in terms of 
political typologies (e.g., terrorist group, insurgency, revolutionary movement). According 
to the research done by Craig Whiteside, ISIS best fits into the definition of an insurgency 
because it has mastered many aspects of Mao’s concept of revolutionary warfare. In Mao’s 
famous work On Guerilla Warfare a revolutionary movement is described as an organized 
movement that has an ideological component and has a purpose of destroying an existing 
society and its institutions and implementing a new state structure.31 In the case of ISIS, 
this is precisely their goal—to rid Muslim majority states of their current governments and 
create an ultraconservative, transnational Islamic State—which requires a restructuring of 
society that is compliant with what they view as the most pure form of Sharia law. Based 
on its purpose and the fact that it is an organized movement with an Islamic ideological 
component, ISIS fits the defining characteristics of a revolutionary movement. 
Mao also claims that a revolutionary movement will only be terminated when “it 
has succeeded in displacing the incumbent government or is liquidated.”32 Mao further 
explains that “there is very little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement 
after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant 
segment of the population.”33 Based on Whiteside’s discussion of ISIS’s reversion to 
Phase I as a result of tribal backlash, it can be said that although the group may not have 
been destroyed or terminated at that point, a lack of support from local tribes caused 
significant obstacles for the group’s expansion and diminished its progression. These 
arguments would suggest that local support of the population is a determining factor in any 
such organization’s success and progression, which will likely shape its decisions and the 
way in which it balances certain aspects of its development toward its ultimate goal. For 
instance, based on Islamic State archive documents translated by Aymenn Jawad Al-
Tamimi that reflect ISIS’s administration of education, employment, public services, and 
                                                 
31 Zedong Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000) 7. 
32 Mao, 27. 
33 Mao. 
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religious life as a means of not only remaining embedded within the population but also 
supporting the population in hopes of furthering the society in which the organization is 
attempting to establish itself, but also providing basic needs in order to gain some popular 
support.34  
The literature on ISIS also describes ways in which it provides its soldiers the 
necessities in order to succeed through a regimen of indoctrination and training as outlined 
in Fishman’s Master Plan. This indoctrination not only provides its members the military 
education on how to fight, but also educates them on the political goal and creates the will 
to fight. A fundamental part of any insurgency or revolutionary movement includes certain 
levels of hostilities but must also have a “clearly defined political goal,” according to 
Mao.35 Without this ideological component, as well as much-needed political and military 
leadership, any such movement will likely fail.36 Mao also discusses the importance of 
indoctrination and political education of the individuals involved in and supporting the 
revolutionary movement in order to create an established loyalty and political alertness to 
the movement’s cause.37 This is especially crucial since the basic element of any war –
regardless of weaponry or machinery—is man. If the individual members of ISIS do not 
hold the political will or desire to fight, this movement will also fail. 
4. Conclusion 
The existing literature on terrorism broadly discusses why organizations employ 
violence, the place of ideology in their political projects, what factors drive their decision-
making, the constancy of their long-term strategies, and the many dilemmas they might 
face. The literature on ISIS discusses the importance of establishing an ultraconservative 
Islamic State in keeping with its apocalyptic ideology and messaging. It also discusses the 
evolution of this organization and how and why it came to be. The gap that this thesis will 
                                                 
34 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents,” Aymenn Jawad 
Al-Tamimi (blog), January 27, 2015, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-
administrative-documents. 
35 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 42. 
36 Mao, 43–44. 
37 Mao, 8. 
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seek to fill lies in the dynamics that shape ISIS’s decision-making and the key factors that 
have influence its behavior. In particular, the organization’s approach to three areas—
violence, local support, and apocalypticism—will be used to measure the organization’s 
willingness to modify elements of its doctrine in order to achieve its objective. This thesis 
will examine its use of these variables over time and provide further analysis as to what 
drives this organization and what factors may be of more importance than others. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis seeks to explain what factors influence how ISIS makes decisions and 
how much the organization is willing to compromise or modify aspects of its religio-
political doctrine in order to achieve its overall objective. Based on the literature discussed, 
there are three underlying themes that will be used in order to test these hypotheses 
throughout ISIS’s existence and evolution: the utilization of violence as a strategy, 
leveraging support from the local population and local tribes, and the use of apocalyptic 
ideology. These themes will be tested in order to determine how influential these factors 
are in ISIS’s decision-making and whether ISIS has modified its behaviors and tactics, its 
actions in large-scale operations, or its political or religious doctrine and overall strategy. 
1. First Hypothesis 
If the use of violence is a vital component in ISIS’s approach toward the 
establishment of a global, united Islamic caliphate, it will remain a consistent factor in the 
course of the organization’s evolution and will be a key factor in its behavior and decision-
making. ISIS uses violence as a mechanism to control the population and instill fear in 
order to create cooperation; therefore, any inconsistencies may be seen as modifications 
made to its doctrine. 
2. Second Hypothesis 
ISIS must also gain support of the population, which may be affected by its use of 
violence. Therefore, the management of the use of force must be leveraged in order to avoid 
alienating too much of the population and gain a certain level of local support to establish 
the caliphate. If support from both local tribes and the general population is vital for the 
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organization’s doctrine toward reaching its objective, it will remain consistent in the 
organization’s decision-making. 
3. Third Hypothesis 
Apocalyptic ideology is a driving factor of ISIS’s existence and its overall purpose. 
If ISIS’s belief in its fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecies is of vital interest to the 
establishment of a global Islamic caliphate, then it will be consistently demonstrated and 
emphasized through the organization’s rhetoric, behavior, and decision-making.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will compare the behavior of ISIS within three separate eras of its 
evolution: the Zarqawi era (2000-2006), the post-Zarqawi era (2007-2013), and the 
Caliphate era (2014-Present). The organization’s consistency or inconsistency over those 
eras will be tested by examining its behavior in three areas: the use of violence, its attempt 
to gain local support, and its application of apocalyptic ideology. To test the hypotheses 
discussed earlier, particular attention will be paid to any changes or modifications in how 
these factors are applied by ISIS and any explanation for this variation in behavior. 
ISIS’s use of violence will be looked at in terms of the amount of violence applied 
throughout the group’s evolution and whether or not the level of violence has changed or 
remained the same over time. The type of violence will also be examined in order to 
understand the variation of its methods and proportionality to its targets. The selection of 
targets will also be a significant factor, particularly as the next factor of gaining local 
support is examined. Any attempts made by ISIS to discriminate in its use of force or 
violence in order to meet its objective will also be viewed as important to this research, as 
it will provide some insight as to what it values or views as more important in particular 
situations. This will allow for some analysis on how the organization makes certain 
decisions and whether they can be viewed as stepping stones toward its ultimate objective. 
Support from local tribes and the general population as well as the fulfillment of 
apocalyptic ideology will also be looked at in terms of its relevance on ISIS’s decision-
making and if this is actually a factor of the organization’s religious or political doctrine 
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that will lead them to the establishment of the caliphate. This research will determine 
whether or not these factors have remained consistent throughout the evolution of ISIS or 
if they have varied over time or in different situations. If variation exists, it is likely the 
organization does not view these as important as other factors and will be disproven as vital 
to ISIS’s decision-making.  
Research for this thesis will be comprised of a variety of primary and secondary 
sources. Secondary sources will include books, scholarly journal articles, Western and 
Middle East news sources, and other scholarly discourse on relevant topics. Primary 
sources will include translated administrative documents from ISIS, as well as translated 
manuals from Islamist strategists. This research will be limited to documents and sources 
printed in or translated to English. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will comprise five chapters. The first chapter describes the major 
research question, provides a literature review, and introduces the study’s structure. The 
second, third, and fourth chapters will describe the three eras of ISIS’s existence, 
explaining the political and security contexts, threats to the organization at that time, as 
well as the key leaders involved in decision-making, and the structure and operations of 
the organizations that will carry out those decisions. Each of these chapters will closely 
examine the use of violence, attempts to gain local support, as well as the group’s use of 
apocalyptic rhetoric during that time period. The fifth and final chapter will compare the 
application of these elements throughout the different eras and determine if these factors 
remained consistent or if there was some variation over time. The final chapter will also 
summarize the implications of these findings on ISIS as a terrorist organization and provide 
some analysis as to whether or not these factors demonstrate a willingness of the 
organization to modify its doctrine in order to reach its ultimate objective and what this 
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II. THE ZARQAWI ERA (2000-2006) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the time period between 2000 and 2006 when Abu Mu’sab 
al-Zarqawi led al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and guided its actions. This chapter will provide an 
overview of the political and security context in Iraq in order to understand the environment 
that allowed AQI to develop as an organization. It will then highlight key decisions made 
by Zarqawi. Next it will analyze how violence was applied and justified strategically by 
the group in its attempts to achieve its objectives. Then this chapter will analyze any 
attempts made by the group to gain local support from the population, local tribes, and 
other Sunni insurgent groups. Finally, this chapter will analyze the use of apocalyptic 
ideology throughout this era and determine which of these factors, if any, were essential 
and remained consistent in the organization’s decision-making and subsequent behavior. 
The chapter finds that the key drivers of the group’s decision-making during this 
era came from Zarqawi’s grand strategy, which was heavily influenced by his personality, 
his philosophy on the use of excessive violence, and the opportunities created by the 
political and security situation at the time. Gaining support from the local population, tribal 
groups, and Sunni insurgent groups was not an influential factor in decision-making 
throughout this era. AQI made no obvious efforts to gain any support from these groups 
and, in fact, alienated many Sunni insurgent and tribal groups. Apocalyptic ideology also 
did not seem to matter much in the organization’s decision-making during this era and 
showed no indications of influencing the organization’s behavior outside of recruitment 
and messaging. 
Zarqawi had an end-state in mind and was determined to reach it through the 
implementation of his grand strategy, which was heavily influenced by his own personality 
characteristics, and personal philosophy of excessive violence. This grand strategy 
emphasized the use of brutality toward specific targets that would add value and help fulfill 
the overall mission. To Zarqawi, the targets that would best serve the organization’s agenda 
were the Shia and the Iraqi government and security forces. Zarqawi did have personal 
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inclinations toward vengeance and overall brutality that were apparent in the attacks 
against the Jordanian embassy and hotels, and the brutal beheadings of international 
civilians but his agenda against the Shia population appeared to me more strategic rather 
than a personal vendetta. As indicated in Zarqawi’s letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, his 
emphasis in target selection was against the Shia population—rather than the U.S. forces 
as Zawahiri insisted. Zarqawi viewed the Shia as the larger threat since he anticipated the 
United States’ eventual departure from Iraq but foresaw a threat in Shia-dominated 
governance in Iraq. To Zarqawi, eliminating the Shia threat was essential in achieving his 
objective. Even though Zarqawi’s personal influence played a large role in the development 
and implementation of the organization’s strategy, many of his decisions were based on 
the strategic impact these targets were believed to have which would further the 
organization’s objective. 
Much of AQI’s application of violence was heavily influenced by Zarqawi’s brutal 
nature, his personal inclinations toward vengeance, and opportunism. Zarqawi developed 
an excessively violent ideology and culture among his leaders that remained within the 
organization even after Zarqawi’s death. Zarqawi’s strategy of utilizing violence as a 
means to punish, coerce, and gain power was applied during a political security crisis of 
the time, which allowed his organization to take advantage of the current situation in order 
to achieve the objective. Zarqawi’s driven, yet somewhat impatient and brutal nature, his 
instrumental use of the current political security situation in Iraq, and his utilization of 
lessons learned from past jihadist mistakes allowed him to devise a grand strategy in order 
to establish the caliphate.  
During this era, forming alliances with local tribes and Sunni insurgent groups in 
Iraq was not a significant part of the organization’s grand strategy and did not force AQI 
to limit its use of violence in any way. This became a strong point of dissent between 
Zarqawi and al-Qaeda Central leadership in Afghanistan. Regardless of the criticisms or 
advice from other leaders, Zarqawi continued his strategic use of violence indiscriminately, 
which alienated a significant number of Sunni insurgents and tribesmen. In Zarqawi’s eyes, 
forming alliances and working with local tribes and Sunni insurgent groups was not 
necessary and chose not to limit the group’s use of violence.  
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Additionally, apocalyptic ideology was not initially central to AQI but rather 
emerged gradually as a method of recruitment campaigns and messaging. From 2000 to 
2006, apocalypticism was not a recognizable theme until Zarqawi used pieces of the 
ideology in a video message. He described the recent events of the U.S. invasion, the 
partnerships with the Shia, as well as the instability and significant upheaval in the country 
as the approaching of the “End of Days” which would be hailed by the re-establishment of 
the caliphate. According to the prophecies, the caliphate will be the place to fight for the 
Muslim savior, the Mahdi, who will return at the Final Hour. Based on available evidence, 
it is difficult to determine if Zarqawi had a genuine belief in the fulfillment of the 
apocalyptic prophecies or if apocalypticism was simply a convenient ideology he used to 
explain the chaos at the time and leverage support for furthering AQI’s objectives and 
establishing the caliphate. 
B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT 
Upon U.S. intervention into Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent removal of the 
Ba’athist government, the state of Iraq was left ungoverned, vulnerable to security threats, 
and subject to severe economic and social turmoil. Saddam Hussein had had a tight grip on 
the Iraqi social and state apparatus for the previous 35 years and was removed within a 
matter of only three weeks, This left the state at a stand-still, halted all state institutions, 
economic activity, and public services.38 Process of removing all Ba’ath party members 
from state employment, known as de-Ba’athification, and subsequent dissolution of the 
Iraqi army and security services forced 500,000 people to became instantly unemployed.39 
Particularly after Saddam Hussein’s buildup and expansion of the military throughout the 
Iran-Iraq war and the following Gulf War, the de-Ba’athification law left highly trained 
military operators and officers without work and with limited skills for future employment. 
Their unemployment and effective blacklisting by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
extended the impact of de-Ba’athification beyond the former Ba’ath Party members and 
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civil servants to their families, affecting approximately 10% of the population: 2.4 million 
people.40  
The removal of the security apparatus that maintained order throughout the state 
and the U.S. and coalition’s inability to provide security to local population due to sheer 
numbers, created a reduced security capability and a window of opportunity for local 
Islamist militant organization recruitment efforts.41 As one former Iraqi soldier stated, “I 
haven’t been working for the last two weeks. If I stay like this for another week, my family 
will starve; and if someone comes with $50 and asks me to toss a grenade at the Americans, 
I’ll do it with pleasure.”42 Many of the displaced military and security forces had become 
riddled with financial insecurity and only possessed skills in firearms handling and military 
operations—skills that would be useful to militant insurgent organizations.43  
The destruction of state institutions as a result of the U.S.-led invasion and the de-
Ba’athification policy of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq fueled the social 
turmoil and triggered a steadily growing sectarian and political divide between Arab 
Sunnis, who largely backed the former Baathist government, and Shia Muslims, who were 
seen as the main beneficiaries of the post-Baathist reforms.44 In a climate such as this, 
where security conditions are constantly changing, identity-based groups are given more 
opportunity to develop and pursue political and material efforts on their own rather than 
await the workings of a formal state system;45 AQI took advantage of this opportunity.46 
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C. KEY LEADERSHIP IN DECISION-MAKING 
In the midst of this political upheaval, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was able to establish 
a following of individuals who he would command as the “Jordanian founder and emir of 
AQI and godfather of the Islamic State.”47 Prior to his stint in Iraq, Zarqawi had fought 
with the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets and continued to preach the call to Islam 
after the war with the help of his mentor, the jihadist cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. 
The two were sent to prison after a failed attack designed to thwart the Jordanian-Israeli 
peace agreement in 1994. When Zarqawi and Maqdisi were released from prison, Zarqawi 
traveled back to Afghanistan and began his own training camp in Herat with the 
institutional and financial support from al-Qaeda, which was “the world’s most prominent 
jihadi group” at the time.48 
Al-Maqdisi, was influential in developing Zarqawi’s view of Islam and Sharia law, 
which influenced the foundational objectives of AQI. Maqdisi was known as “one of the 
world’s most prominent jihadi ideologues” and worked with Zarqawi in proselytizing the 
Salafi-Jihadist message and criticizing the Jordanian government for its relations with 
Israel.49 The two worked closely together until they began to diverge during their time in 
prison. Maqdisi took a more peaceful, vocal role in criticizing the Jordanian monarchy; 
Zarqawi was looking for a fight. 
Zarqawi’s experience in the Jordanian prison likely left deep scars on his 
character.50 He had been kept in solitary confinement for over an eight-month period, and 
likely endured extensive physical and psychological torture. During that experience, he 
seemed to undergo a political and religious transformation. He eventually moved away 
from being a follower of Maqdisi to becoming a feared leader within the prison walls.51 
After Zarqawi was released from prison and began operating his own training camp in 
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Afghanistan he was able to learn the responsibilities of running an organization and 
demonstrate his ability to command an organization of fighters. Zarqawi’s responsibilities 
of command at his training camp in Herat, the influence of his mentor, his experience in 
prison, coupled with his experience in war against the Soviets all molded his rough 
character that laid the foundation for AQI.52 
During 1999–2006, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda Central’s 
leadership, partnered with Zarqawi and provided funding for his camp in Herat allowing 
him autonomy in how he commanded it. Zawahiri was al-Qaeda’s second-in-command on 
9/11 was named emir of al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden’s death. With a common 
objective of uniting Muslims globally through a “transnational caliphate” and enforcing 
Sharia law senior al-Qaeda leaders disagreed on what the implementation looked like.53 
Clashes among leadership created divisions in the Levantine jihadi network which 
provided an opportunity for Zarqawi to re-build those networks and further the objective 
in a region where al-Qaeda had been historically weak.54 After 1999, Zarqawi and bin 
Laden realized the dissimilarities in their visions of how to establish the caliphate, yet the 
two put aside their differences and Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden in 2004.55 Al-
Qaeda leadership would continue to have an influence in the development of the 
organization in the coming years, although the level of influence would change over time. 
D. STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 
1. Application of Violence 
Zarqawi’s role was significant in the development of AQI, and its adherence to a 
brutally violent ideology, later became to be known as “Zarqawiism” by Western scholars. 
Followers of Zarqawi continued to carry out his philosophy of brutality even after his death, 
known as Zarqawiists. The critical principle of Zarqawiism uses religious rhetoric to justify 
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extreme violence in order to establish an austere form of puritanical Salafist Islam.56 
Zarqawi did not believe any Muslim-majority state was a legitimate Islamic state since no 
government was operating wholly under sharia law. He argued that all governments had 
strayed away from God’s law by either following man-made laws and governance, or by 
directly going against God’s law. Even the government of Saudi Arabia, which has 
operated under sharia, has strayed away by allying with the United States and allowing 
U.S. forces on their soil during the 1991 Gulf war. Zarqawi sought to re-establish the 
caliphate because he saw the caliphate as the only legitimate authority of the Muslim world 
that would adhere to his implementation of sharia law. 
According to Zarqawi’s, extremely narrow vision of what it means to be a “true” 
Muslim, an individual cannot call himself a true Muslim without thoroughly carrying out 
Sharia Law. Zarqawi’s mentor, Maqdisi, developed a political ideology based on the 
concept of al-wal’a w’al bara’a, the notion that Muslims should remain loyal to Islam and 
disavow everything that contradicts Islamic belief, which rejects all political leaders who 
do not enforce his version of Sharia law.57 Anyone who acts outside of this law—
particularly any supporters of manmade government, or anyone who supports or aids these 
governments—is considered a nonbeliever. Zarqawi’s narrow definition of a “true” 
Muslim considered a great majority of the Muslim world to be apostates deserving death 
and enforced brutal tactics as a justified means to implement Sharia law and establish the 
caliphate.58 These were important concepts that were implemented within the organization 
and carried out by its leaders, thus having a direct impact on decision-making of who is 
deserving of death. 
An underlying assumption within Zarqawiism is the notion that violence and killing 
of nonbelievers is justified by the Quran59 and while killing in the name of God seems 
baffling to many– Muslims and non-Muslims—knowing the ins and outs of Islam, the 
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Quran, or the hadith was not a requirement for Zarqawi or his soldiers.60 Soldiers were 
trained based on Zarqawi’s understandings and interpretations of Islam and acted as he 
commanded. One of Zarqawi’s mentors and leader of the Mujahideen Army, Abu Zahra 
al-Issawi a Salafist jihadist armed group in Iraq, described Zarqawi’s behavior of 
sanctioning killing against Muslims “based on false grounds and an overzealous twisting 
of the Islamic doctrine.” Al-Issawi claims Zarqawi used distorted interpretations of the 
Sunna in order to legitimize his acts of terror in Iraq.61 Zarqawi was not well educated, had 
limited knowledge in classical Arabic, and learned the Quran through secondhand 
interpretation from Salafi-jihadists who likely indoctrinated their ideological 
interpretations upon Zarqawi.62  
The manifestos of jihadist strategists played a strong influence in the organization’s 
grand strategy and furthered the justification for eliminating nonbelievers. These 
documents provided guidance from past jihadists on violence aligned with ideology which 
was used by many jihadi leaders including Zarqawi.63 The Management of Savagery 
manifesto written under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji provides direction for the 
establishment of an Islamic State and discusses operational questions of leadership, 
training programs, target selection, and, essential elements of governance.64 Zarqawi 
utilized this document during its circulation in the early 2000s as a justification for ex-
communicating groups of people. The seven stage master plan was another document used 
as a roadmap of the organization’s strategy and progression in order to reestablish the 
caliphate, which was a joint effort between Zarqawi and Sayf al-Adl—al-Qaeda’s feared 
security chief, played a role in.65 Finally, the Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad 
by Abu Abdullah al-Muhajjer, which calls on Salafi-jihadists to establish a purely unified 
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Islamic state by any means necessary, provides further guidance and influenced key leaders 
such as Zarqawi in applying his strategy of violence in order to establish the caliphate. 
The level of violence and brutality was further fueled by the leftover Ba’athist 
regime leaders who joined Zarqawi’s ranks since they were already familiar with such 
tactics during their work under Saddam Hussein.66 Zarqawi’s developing organization of 
AQI was able to channel the tools of repression used by the Ba’athist regime and the 
country’s bitter legacy of violence into supporting his own cause/vision.67 Zarqawi’s men 
were able to bring many Ba’athists left without work, retirement pension, or any lingering 
of future career opportunities to his cause and continue to perpetuate the “brutal tactics of 
the Ba’athist regime” which demonstrated its intolerance for dissent and used terror to 
silence the opposition.68 Ba’ath party members who were no longer able serve in the Iraqi 
government found a perfect niche within Zarqawi’s growing organization at the time of the 
U.S. invasion.69 
In the minds of key leadership, viciousness was seen as a necessary ingredient for 
victory, and the end-state of establishing the Islamic state justified the means of brutality 
that was used to get there. The history of success of regimes gaining power in the Middle 
East, such as the Mongols, the Israelites, the Saud family, as a product of viciousness and 
violence further justified the claim that violence actually works.70 Brutality was not 
incompatible with establishing a caliphate and was a justified means to reach their desired 
end-state.71 
AQI’s target selection and methods of violence were either designed to fit into the 
overall grand strategy, were targets of opportunity that added value to the strategy, or were 
acts of personal vengeance that were made to fit into that grand strategy. Based on the level 
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of Zarqawi’s influence, the attacks carried out by AQI were primarily targets selected by 
Zarqawi himself and were likely influenced by his personality and history. Many of the 
attacks carried out in the early years of AQI were a variety of car bombs and suicide bomb 
attacks that killed hundreds of innocent civilians in both Jordan and Iraq, and many Shia 
Muslims. Zarqawi selected targets that hurt the Jordanian and U.S. governments, likely as 
an effort to seek revenge. He chose targets directed at Shia Muslims, however, as an effort 
to stir up a sectarian conflict and ignite Sunni mobilization to join AQI. Other targets 
selected appeared to be targets of opportunity, such as kidnappings of foreigners that could 
have resulted in financial rewards, beheadings that were meant to gain attention and 
provoke fear, and random indiscriminate killings to eliminate any opposition and gain 
control or exert greater influence. 
Zarqawi considered Shia Muslims to be apostates and therefore a legitimate target 
of his group’s attacks. He viewed the Shia as a threat to the establishment of the caliphate 
that needed to be violently purged from the Islamic fold. In a memo written by Zarqawi to 
al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Zarqawi demonstrates his 
genocidal anti-Shia ideology by depicting the Shia as an existential threat that needed to 
be exterminated.72 He accused the Shias of having “befriended and supported the 
Americans and stood in their ranks against the mujahidin” and used Quranic scriptures to 
justify the murdering of Shia Muslims.73 Through the targeted and indiscriminate attacks 
on Shiites, Zarqawi sought to create a deep sectarian divide that would force Sunni 
insurgents to align with him and help further his cause. It is unclear from this research if 
Zarqawi actually held a deep, personal hatred for Shias or if this was a strategic move that 
would be instrumental in achieving his ultimate objective. Zarqawi sought bloodshed by 
killing Shia political and religious leaders until a sectarian war began.74 In order to achieve 
the establishment of an Islamic State, Zarqawi needed to gain control over Sunni groups 
by eliminating tribal loyalty and Iraqi nationalism and replace them with an “ideological 
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commitment to jihadi-Salafi ideological goals.”75 Zarqawi’s goal was to create a Sunni-
Shia civil war that was big enough and bloody enough to mobilize Sunnis and harden their 
attitudes toward Iraqi Shia. He hoped this would help gain the support of Sunnis for AQI 
by demonstrating that “only jihadist extremism and brutality could keep Sunnis safe.”76 
Targeting Shia was a strategy used by Zarqawi as a means to seize the opportunity provided 
by the political discord at the time and achieve his desired end state. 
Zarqawi’s disdain for the Jordanian government that imprisoned him and his desire 
for revenge heavily influenced his target selection as he considered all “policemen, judges, 
and government members of all ranks” as supporters of the regime and henceforth targets 
for AQI.77 Zarqawi also justified the excommunication and killing of any policeman tasked 
by the Americans to fight the mujahedeen. Based on the group’s broad definition of 
nonbelievers and potential targets, the fact that Jordan is chosen above any other nation 
seems to be a target selection more closely aligned with personal vendetta rather than 
strategic objective. The Jordanian government that imprisoned him, and tortured him 
deepened his hatred and resentment toward the government and all those who worked for 
it, thereby explaining Zarqawi’s desire for revenge and the organization’s actions since 
Zarqawi played a heavy role in the group’s decision-making. In August 2003—several 
months after the U.S. invasion into Iraq—Zarqawi’s organization executed a car bombing 
attack at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad that left at least 17 dead and many more 
injured.78 Instead of directing an attack at the Americans occupying Iraq at the time—who 
were considered the “far enemy” that supported the local governments that undermine 
jihadi efforts, and were now easier, more proximate targets—Zarqawi directed his attack 
at the government that allowed the abuse and torture he endured in prison, and the 
intelligence services that restricted his freedom and harassed Zarqawi and his mother when 
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attempting to leave Jordan, among many other grievances.79 Similarly, in November 2005, 
the near-simultaneous attacks that took place at three main hotels in Amman, Jordan killed 
Jordanian citizens; families celebrating weddings; innocent people who have never harmed 
Zarqawi or any part of his organization.80 Zarqawi later claimed that these attacks were 
targeted at U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials who were occupying these hotels but it is 
unclear if this was his actual intent or was a fabrication that took place as a means to inflict 
greater death and destruction against the Jordanian state that had caused him so much pain. 
Zarqawi’s target selection appears to have been influenced by his own personal hatred and 
resentment rather than simply being a stepping-stone toward the establishment of an 
Islamic state. 
The U.S. government was subjected to more indirect attacks which were designed 
to attrite their resources, draw out a long, complex conflict while also deterring other 
nations from entering the conflict to support. AQI directed attacks toward a UN diplomat, 
the UN headquarters in Baghdad, a luxury hotel in Baghdad, the Headquarters of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and four police stations across Baghdad which 
left up to 70 dead and hundreds more wounded. These attacks appeared to have more 
strategic implications in terms of forcing out nongovernmental organizations and 
discouraging anyone from opening an embassy in Iraq—leaving Americans isolated and 
with little support.81 This type of strategy appears to be more in line with the teachings of 
these jihadi manifestos that explain the need for a war of attrition in order wear down the 
enemy’s resources and draw out their efforts into a long and painful conflict.82 
A final target group of Zarqawi’s organization was a combination of ostensibly 
random individuals that happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time but were used 
as a mechanism for spreading fear, gaining legitimacy and financial resources, and also 
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deterring outsiders from entering AQI’s declared territory. These individuals were 
imprisoned, tortured, held for ransom, or even beheaded. The beheading of American 
business entrepreneur Nicholas Berg was an attack carried out solely because he was 
American and in the wrong place at the wrong time. Berg served no strategic purpose, was 
not a prominent figure within the U.S. political system, and was not attempting to combat 
the efforts of AQI or diminish its credibility in any way or speak out against the Islamic 
faith. Many others suffered a similar fate; some were even tortured until their ultimate 
execution while awaiting a potential ransom to be paid from their respective country; if a 
country did not pay, then that individual was executed.83 This particular aspect of the 
organization’s behavior is interesting in that its targets appear to be somewhat random, 
although further research is required. These targets served no strategic purpose other than 
to demonstrate the group’s desire for financial gain and its willingness to use extreme 
brutality indiscriminately. 
Zarqawi was the primary influence in the organization’s application of violence 
during this period. Zarqawi’s extreme personality shaped by his traumatic experiences in 
prison, coupled with his elementary understanding and interpretation of Islam; the 
guidance provided by jihadi manifestos; the leftover Ba’athist brutality measures; and the 
historical examples that demonstrate the effectiveness of violence, heavily influenced 
Zarqawi personally and his extremely violent operational approach. That approach was 
integrated into the organization’s grand strategy as a means of accomplishing the objective 
of establishing an Islamic caliphate. 
2. Attempts to Gain Support  
AQI was unsuccessful in gaining support from the local population and local 
tribesmen and eventually declared them as targets along with Sunni insurgents and Iraqi 
nationalists due to the significant tension that existed, mainly due to AQI’s attacks on 
innocent civilians and methods of attempting to gain control. AQI attempted to exert 
control and impose its will over tribal areas in Iraq while making no attempts at concessions 
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or any type of coordination with the tribal leaders or Sunni insurgent organizations.84 A 
vast number of Sunni insurgents were reluctant to forego their nationalist or tribal 
ideologies and submit to an organization responsible for the deaths of hundreds of innocent 
Iraqis. While AQI was able to sway the allegiance of some local insurgents through 
financial rewards for successful killings, local tribes became fed up with AQI and even 
though many of their fighters were Iraqis they were considered a largely foreign force that 
local insurgents were not easily going to submit to.85 At this point in the development of 
Zarqawi’s organization it was clear that gaining support from the local population and the 
local tribes were not a priority—or at least not one that exceeded the organization’s need 
for clearly identifying its desire and willingness to use brutal tactics in order to gain control 
or power. 
3. Apocalypticism 
During the early years of AQI and Zarqawi, the ideology of apocalypticism did not 
appear to be a significant driving factor in decision-making during this time frame, nor did 
it appear to be the foundation on which the organization was built upon but rather a 
messaging tool that was utilized along the way. The only mention of apocalyptic ideology 
is discussed closer to the end of this timeframe when Zarqawi begins his videotape 
messaging and attempts to appeal to new recruits claiming that the end of days is 
approaching and it is time to support the cause of establishing the caliphate. There were no 
recognized use of apocalypticism within the aforementioned jihadist manifestos, nor was 
it apparent in any type of correspondence from Zarqawi. This ideology did not appear to 
be a large priority of Zarqawi, which could have played a role in its limited impact since 
he had such a significant influence in the organization’s foundation and development. 
Research has shown that this became a larger phenomenon later on in the organization’s 
evolution after Zarqawi’s death, which will be discussed in later chapters. Apocalypticism, 
therefore, appears to be a messaging maneuver rather than a foundational belief and was 
not a significant factor in the decision-making of the organization. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
AQI’s decision-making was largely driven by their grand strategy, which was 
driven by a key individual—Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi. His personal inclination toward 
extreme violence and acts of vengeance, and the opportunities created by the political 
situation at the time were key factors in developing the organization’s strategy. Violence 
loosely justified by Islamic precedent and law superseded the need to gain local support or 
the emphasis of apocalyptic ideology. AQI clashed with local tribes and other Sunni 
insurgent organizations because of their brutal tactics and attacks against Iraqi civilians, 
yet the organization was not willing to compromise or reduce their level of violence during 
this era. Additionally, the use of apocalyptic scriptures was never used as a foundation or 
key driver of decision-making at this time. The only demonstration of apocalypticism was 
used in the context of recruitment messaging rather than being an integral part of the 
group’s grand strategy. Therefore, the implementation of violence as part of the group’s 
grand strategy remained a consistent priority throughout this era, while attempts to gain 
support and apocalyptic ideology were not prioritized. 
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III. THE POST-ZARQAWI ERA (2006-2013)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the time period after the death of Zarqawi in which AQI 
underwent a leadership transition, persevered through the tribal Awakening backlash, and 
established the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This chapter will first describe the political 
environment and security situation in Iraq that will impact the organization’s development 
and setbacks. Next, this chapter will discuss the key leaders involved in decision-making 
while highlighting the significance of individual leadership during this era, particularly the 
transition from a charismatic leader such as Zarqawi to the legal-rational leadership of Abu 
Hamzah and Abu Umar. Next, this chapter will analyze the excessive use of violence as 
part of the organization’s strategy and the change in its approach in dealing with local tribes 
and Sunni insurgents. Finally, this chapter will discuss apocalypticism during this time 
period and the limited influence it had in leadership decision-making as part of the 
organization’s grand strategy. 
This chapter finds that the adaptability of the individual leadership shaped the 
organization’s strategy differently than the previous era, thus demonstrating the 
significance of the individual leaders’ influence in the organization. The organization’s 
grand strategy was centralized around the use of violence; however, limiting its use of 
excessive violence in order to avoid further alienation from the local Sunni tribes and 
insurgent groups was a larger motivator during this time period. ISI sought to consolidate 
the base of their organization by coercing and co-opting Sunni militants, while also offering 
various incentives.86 Especially after feeling the significant backlash of the Awakening 
Council, ISI learned how to balance excessive violence with mobilizing support in order 
to gain the Sunni baseline required for expansion.87 ISI leaders offered forgiveness to these 
tribal leaders who had previously fought against them with the U.S. and coalition forces 
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while also targeting rival Sunni Islamist groups who would interfere with ISI’s ability to 
grow and expand.88 This is one example in which the organization modified its doctrine in 
order to achieve its objective. 
B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT 
Chaos and disorder continued during the U.S. occupation in Iraq and the re-building 
of the Iraqi government and security forces. The predominantly Shia leadership in Iraq, 
their continued efforts of consolidating power, the sectarian-viewed policies, and the forced 
displacement of citizens based on religious affiliation fueled the sectarian polarization in 
Iraq during this era.89 AQI furthered this sectarian climate by leveraging the political 
grievances created as a result of the government’s displacement of Sunni communities and 
using that as a tool to unite with Sunni groups in order to grow and further their cause. The 
opportunities created by the political and security environment allowed AQI to capitalize 
on perceived acts of retaliation from the government toward Sunnis in addition to the 
attacks from Shia insurgent groups. These circumstances allowed AQI to re-brand its 
organization, build alliances and leverage partnerships in order to establish itself as the 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).  
As this organization began to grow, however, so did its opposition. ISI had 
alienated a significant number of Sunni tribes and insurgent nationalist by attempting to 
take over areas that these groups had maintained control for several years. More 
significantly, ISI’s continuous attacks against Iraqi civilians fueled hatred and resentment 
against this organization, creating more individuals willing to fight against them. This 
context eventually led to the creation of the Awakening Council—also known as the Sahwa 
forces—which was a compilation of Sunni tribes and many other resistance groups who 
were fed up with ISI and began liaising with the U.S. and coalition forces in order to combat 
this organization that was gaining too much power. The Sahwa forces worked with U.S. 
and coalition forces to diminish the effectiveness of ISI’s operations in Iraq.  
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The impact of the Sahwa forces was a tremendous blow to ISI that significantly 
reduced the territory and resources of the organization forcing its withdrawal in many 
areas. However, once the primarily Sunni Sahwa forces were placed under Iraqi 
government authorities in 2008 rather than under U.S. control, their effectiveness 
diminished over a short time. Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, managed to 
consolidate his political power and control over a vast number of state institutions—which 
included the armed forces reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister.90 Maliki did not 
provide substantial support to the primarily Sunni Sahwa forces, possibly to limit the 
potential of this organization gaining too much strength and rising against the 
government.91 When Iraqi authorities began persecuting and arresting leaders and 
members of the previously U.S.-backed Sahwa forces, this fueled the government’s anti-
Sunni narrative and demonstrated their lack of support for these forces. This direct 
targeting of Sunnis coupled with the forced displacement of Sunnis was seen as sectarian 
retaliation on the part of the government, creating larger numbers of people frustrated with 
the Iraqi government without the support of the coalition forces to compensate/support. 
Although, the Sahwa forces were never intended to be a long-term solution to the ISI 
problem, their effectiveness had run its course over a short period of time but the vicious 
cycle of “sectarian polarization” continued.92  
ISI was able to recover from the backlash of the Sahwa forces by admitting past 
mistakes, forming partnerships and alliances, while capitalizing on the grievances created 
by the predominantly Shia government. “Further insight after conversations with Iraqi 
tribal leaders revealed that many of those who have joined ISI have done so as a means to 
resist the Shia-dominated regime, or to turn against the regime it previously supported 
rather than purely its Islamist ideology.”93 ISI became the only recognizable alternative to 
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a “broken and corrupt” regime.94 After the U.S. withdrawal, some Sunnis were convinced 
that the government would seize and sentence them, especially after a tribal leader from 
the Sahwa forces was arrested by Iraqi government officials and sentenced to death.95 This 
allowed the opportunity for ISI to capitalize on these grievances and attract disenchanted 
Sunnis to its organization. Through these efforts, ISI continued to expand and re-built 
relationships with local Sunni insurgents and tribes growing both in force numbers and 
overall strength. 
The effects of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and the devolution of the Syrian civil 
war also created an opportunity for ISI to expand and develop a network in Syria known 
as Jabat al-Nusra (JaN).96 When Baghdadi sought to reveal the true identity of JaN as an 
extension of ISI and merge the two networks together the original commanders sent to 
Syria to set up the organization, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, refused. This created some 
internal conflict within the organization, presented certain limitations, and created 
divergence within the organization. This, however, did not prevent the organization from 
its continued growth and ultimate re-establishment of the caliphate by Abu Bakr al-
Baghdad in 2014, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
C. KEY LEADERS IN DECISION-MAKING 
The transition from a charismatic leader such as Zarqawi to legal-rational style 
leaders, such as Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar, had a significant impact on decision-making 
and the subsequent behavior of the organization. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri, commonly known as Abu Hamzah al-Muhajjer, were the most influential leaders 
throughout this era as appointed emir, and defense minister respectively after Zarqawi’s 
death.97 After their deaths in 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was named emir of the 
organization and expanded the organization into Syria, declaring the name the Islamic State 
in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The significant part of Baghdadi’s influence to the organization 
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will be discussed in the next chapter. Abu Umar was a good candidate as emir of ISI since 
he was Iraqi-born and AQ Central leaders sought to reduce the reputation of ISI being a 
foreign-born organization seeking to intrude into the Iraqi territory. Abu Hamzah appeared 
to have greater presence in the organization as defense minister based on the amount of 
sources available on the correspondence of him—however his instructions are assumed to 
be aligned with that of Abu Umar as both leaders seem to have had a similar leadership 
style. 
The transition that took place after Zarqawi’s death emphasized the significance of 
individual leadership to the organization. The differences in leadership style between 
Zarqawi and Abu Hamzah affected the implementation and modification of the 
organization’s strategy, relationships within the organization, as well as interactions with 
other Sunni organizations. Zarqawi was a charismatic leader who went against the grain, 
developed and implemented new strategies and ideologies and rallied supporters to carry 
out his vision.98 Zarqawi was able to inspire others with his vision of establishing the 
caliphate. Abu Umar and Abu Hamzah’s leadership fit the legal-rational authority 
description, which was demonstrated in their decision-making. These leaders focused on 
those actions that would lead to the success of the organization achieving its ultimate 
objective rather than bringing forth new and innovative ideas and strategies and rallying 
support. 
D. STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 
1. Application of Violence 
Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar’s leadership style influenced the organization’s 
application of violence and target selection. While Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar sought to 
continue the work Zarqawi started and preserve this following, these leaders made 
decisions that would lead to the growth and expansion of the organization’s power and 
influence but were not always in keeping with Zarqawi’s strategy. Shortly after Abu 
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Hamzah came into his leadership role in September 2006 he called for an increase of 
indiscriminate violence against Americans and Shia Muslims in his 15 day strategy.99 Abu 
Hamzah tried walking a fine line between Zarqawiism and allegiance to al-Qaeda central 
leadership in order to leverage both of those resources for the sake of the organization. If 
the violence continued to subside after Abu Hamzah came into AQI leadership, he may be 
viewed as weak and unfit as this group’s leader and this message was a perfect opportunity 
to inspire confidence.100 If he strayed too far away from the Zarqawiist ideology he would 
likely have lost the support of the remaining Zarqawiists; yet he also did not want to 
completely break ties with AQ leadership—especially given his history with Aymen al-
Zawahiri as well as the networks and resources to gain from this organization. Abu 
Hamzah’s call for attacks against the Americans was likely an appeal to AQ Central 
leadership and not necessarily part of his grandiose vision or strategy for the 
organization.101 This call for violence could have also been an effort to determine 
individuals’ commitment to the cause and weed out those who were less committed. Either 
way, this decision appeared to be more calculated rather than a rash, vengeful type of 
decision and the mark of a legal-rational type leader.  
Shortly after voicing his 15 day strategy and putting out a call for violence, Abu 
Hamzah offered amnesty to the Sunni tribes who had previously fought against AQI and 
attempted to reconcile those relationships with Sunni tribes and insurgent groups.102 This 
call for unity and forgiveness was very different than the organization’s implementation of 
a strict takfiri ideology against anyone who disagreed with its strategy and justified killing 
many Sunnis—including tribal and insurgent leaders.103 Yet based on Abu Hamzah’s 
announcement, if these tribal leaders were willing to admit their mistakes and join ranks 
with AQI they would be forgiven. This was a unique inflection point in the organization’s 
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strategy as it attempted to move in a direction different than Zarqawi’s confrontational 
strategy. AQI had already alienated a number of the tribal groups and Sunni nationalist/
insurgent groups when it made efforts to take over smuggling routes and other illicit 
enterprises that these groups had long controlled.  
These efforts of reconciliation made by Abu Hamzah would be challenging yet 
would significantly play in the organization’s favor.104 Reducing the amount of enemies 
and targets for the newly established Islamic State of Iraq would allow the organization to 
maximize efforts against more productive targets, especially since the organization was not 
strong enough to support a full-scale war with all of the Sunnis in Iraq. This was likely not 
a genuine forgiveness but a rational attempt at looking beyond past conflicts and moving 
forward with decisions and partnerships that would stimulate the best results. ISI leadership 
saw it necessary to balance the level of violence with the amount of support required from 
local Sunni tribes and insurgent organizations in order to ensure their survival and growth. 
Once again, its leaders chose the opportunity that would best serve the objective of the 
organization rather than strictly adhering to the previously established Zarqawiist ideology. 
This type of decision is a reflection of a rational leader seeking to make the best decisions 
for the survival and progress of the organization. 
Even after Abu Hamzah’s attempt at forging new partnerships and establishing the 
Islamic State in Iraq, not all tribal leaders were willing to align themselves with this group 
and the opposition continued to grow. This eventually resulted in the Awakening council 
or Sahwa forces which consisted of a number of tribes and Sunni insurgents who partnered 
with the U.S. and coalition forces to combat the growing threat of ISI. The effects of the 
Sahwa forces were felt dramatically by the newly established ISI, especially in 
collaboration with U.S. and coalition forces. With the indigenous knowledge of the 
territory combined with the resources and training from occupation forces, ISI lost 
significant territory and resources and was forced out of many major cities in Iraq. After 
feeling the backlash of the Sahwa forces, Abu Hamzah delivered instructions to his local 
emirs that significantly diverged from his previous 15 day strategy.  
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ISI’s target selection was still broad yet calculated and appeared to be focused on 
removing any sort of enemy that would become an obstacle in reaching the caliphate. ISI 
conducted a greater number of attacks against the Iraqi government and security forces 
rather than the Awakening forces or coalition forces in Iraq from 2007–2010.105 Based on 
statistical research looking at the 2007–2010 timeframe, 77% of ISI attacks were targeting 
Iraqi government and security forces, while only 10% of attacks were targeted against the 
Awakening forces and 13% against coalition forces.106 This could also be explained by 
ISI’s access to broad-based attacks against government buildings and civilians rather than 
carrying out conventional attacks against militarized Sahwa or coalition forces. ISI could 
focus on the target that it had the most direct access to, and the one that would have the 
most long term impact. Even Zarqawi believed the U.S. would withdraw at some point and 
the support of the Awakening forces would diminish over time—they just had to wait out 
the storm. 
ISI’s target selection was made clear in its strategic planning document which calls 
for “nine bullets to the apostates and one bullet to the crusaders” in its military planning 
strategy.107 The Iraqi government and security forces all supporters of the government 
were declared apostates based on Salafi-jihadist interpretations, while the Crusaders were 
viewed as the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. This strategy allowed the organization to 
continue its anti-Shia sentiment initiated by Zarqawi, since the government was 
predominantly Shia, while also weakening the largest threat that stands in its path. This 
document also describes Sun Tzu’s philosophy of creating disorder and internal problems 
within your enemy and forcing them to continuously rebuild rather than grow stronger and 
allows opportunities for ISI to move in and control territory while the government is 
weakened.108 Hitting a target of an enemy’s interests/stakes/claims forces increased 
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security on all the remaining interests/stakes/claims the adversary has—thereby draining 
more resources to combat the security threat.109 
2. Attempts to Gain Support 
In September 2007, approximately one year after Abu Hamzah’s call for violence, 
he distributed instructions to his emirs calling for greater patience, unity, and limitations in 
their levels of violence.110 He explains, “Beware of exaggerating the punishment or 
regretting the pardon; avoid distasteful harshness because the Shari’ah punishes to correct 
not to avenge.”111 Excessive violence as a means of punishment toward the government, 
execution of tribal leaders who disagreed with the organization’s ideology was seen 
throughout the Zarqawi era. Zarqawi’s narrow definition of a true Muslim and al-Maqdisi’s 
concept of al-wal’a w’al bara, which requires loyalty to what is good and the disavowal 
of what is not, encouraged a culture of ex-communication of anyone who does not 
subscribe to AQI’s implementation of Sharia. This foundational layer of thinking promoted 
a culture of excessive punishment toward anyone who did not meet the narrow definition 
of a true Muslim. Zarqawi’s ideology did not promote a cautious, open-minded strategy 
that is being expressed in Abu Hamzah’s instructions “Beware of blood. Beware of spilling 
innocent blood. Nothing can bring destruction or rob you of grace as much as spilling 
innocent blood. Beware of strengthening your position and your soldiers with forbidden 
blood. Such a behavior will eventually lead to vulnerability and powerlessness.”112 This 
is also contrary to Zarqawi’s takfiri ideological approach which was more confrontational 
and declared anyone who was not a believer in his version of Sharia was deserving of death. 
This suggests that Abu Hamzah has recognized, to some degree, the implications of killing 
fellow Sunni Muslims after feeling the efforts of the Sahwa forces throughout 2006–2007 
and is attempting to limit any further deterioration of the organization and focus on its 
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survival and growth by being more discriminate in its use of violence. This shift in strategy 
demonstrated a certain level of adaptability, recognition of past mistakes, and a willingness 
to change rather than continuing to enforce an ideology that may be detrimental to the 
growth and functionality of the organization. 
Abu Hamzah also states, “Do not permit your brothers to kill or capture those who 
might cause a division in their ranks and might disagree among them, even if this was 
permitted in other ways. Unity during fighting is a more important than unmatched 
interest.”113 This is also highlighted in a 2009 document “A Strategic Plan to Strengthen 
the Political Posture of the Islamic State of Iraq,” which discusses the significance of 
forging a unity of effort.114 While Zarqawi recognized the necessity of unity among ranks, 
the compromises expressed in these documents are less of the absolutist strategy Zarqawi 
called for, and more focused on modifying the organization’s doctrine and adapting 
principles and strategies that will lead to further expansion and establishment of a caliphate.  
Abu Hamzah’s call for patience and greater caution in the use of force appeared to 
come from the perspective of a leader who has recognized mistakes made that contributed 
to the backlash that they were facing at the time. Furthermore, uncovered documents 
Analysis of the ISI demonstrated the organization’s recognition and analysis of the mistakes 
of 2006–2007 and sought to amend the organization’s doctrine in order to avoid total 
destruction and continue to grow.115 By modifying this key aspect of the Zarqawi doctrine, 
Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar demonstrated that they recognized the repercussions of such 
an ideology and the limitations of their own capability to carry that out effectively. He 
called for unity in the fight rather than divisions which makes sense if you want any 
organization to be successful, you want to limit internal conflict and/or refrain from 
creating more conflict. Statistical research conducted by Mohammed Hafez demonstrates 
a significant uptick in violence from 2006–2007 followed by a sharp decrease after 
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September 2007—the timeframe in which these instructions were distributed. The study 
conducted does not analyze this document in relation to the changes in violence, but it is 
worth noting as a possible variable for the change, in addition to many others. The 
instructions provided by Abu Hamzah were influenced by his legal-rational style of 
authority combined with an opportunity that presented itself for the organization to avoid 
further backlash and even potentially grow. 
The period of time after Abu Hamzah’s instructions continued the efforts of 
consolidating the base of the organization by aligning other tribesmen and militants with 
its organization. ISI was reluctant to join its cause with other groups but was more 
interested in absorbing other groups and individuals into its fold. In order to do this, ISI 
targeted specific leaders in order to remove individuals that were preventing the 
organization from getting to where it needed to be, rather than declaring an entire tribe or 
Sunni insurgent group as apostates and murdering mass groups of people. Instead, this 
organization took a more discriminate approach in its targeting, not necessarily to make 
allies through a softer approach, but likely as an effort to reduce the amount of effort it 
needed to expend. That is, if a group was preventing ISI from expanding into a particular 
territory, killing off the entire group would require more effort than it would take to remove 
one influential individual, and even offering something in return as a benefit to the 
impeding group. This method of engaging with the local tribes and Sunni insurgent groups 
became more embedded within the culture of ISI and fits the mold of a rational strategic 
approach. This organization made decisions based on an internal logic and rationale in 
order to meet the end-state of the organization. 
3. Apocalypticism 
The organization’s religious doctrine remained to be the foundation of their objective, 
however the religiously inspired apocalyptic ideology appeared to be more instrumental in 
appealing to the masses rather than acting as an essential part of the organization’s strategy. 
There was very little among the correspondence from top-level leaders that demonstrated 
their zest or true belief of the End of Days. For instance, within the letters of instructions and 
advice from Abu Hamzah to the local emirs, the strategic plan for strengthening ISI 
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document, the analysis of ISI documents, and several press releases made by these leaders, 
there was little to indicate that ISI leaders placed apocalyptic ideology into the forefront of 
their decision-making, strategy, or instructions. Phrases were mentioned occasionally in 
public and especially used in recruitment messaging but were rarely emphasized in private 
correspondence. It appears that apocalypticism was effective in ISI’s recruitment and 
propaganda efforts but remained on the backburner of the organization’s strategy and was 
not a significant driver of decision-making in this period. Furthermore, ISI was likely willing 
to modify its apocalyptic doctrine in order to reach its ultimate objective, demonstrating that 
apocalypticism did not have a significant influence in the organization’s ultimate behavior 
and decision-making.116  
E. CONCLUSION 
ISI was an organization that was heavily influenced by the personality and 
leadership style and thinking of its individual leaders. The transition of leadership from a 
charismatic leader such as Zarqawi to the legal-rational thinkers of Abu Hamzah and Abu 
Umar presented a noticeable change that was reflected in the implementation of the 
organization’s strategy. ISI’s leaders were able to make decisions and implement strategy 
that demonstrated its rational thinking as well as its adaptive ability based on the 
developments of the situation at the time. ISI was able to make operational adjustments 
based on the developing operating environment—similar to U.S. military strategy 
execution, and similar adaptive capabilities of many large businesses that seek to modify 
and adapt to the changes in society and the market. 
This organization focused its targeted efforts on weakening the Iraqi government 
while slowly moderating its attacks against other Sunnis, it allowed many groups that were 
disgruntled by the government an opportunity to join forces with ISI. This was especially 
productive after the Sahwa forces were turned over to the Iraqi government and were no 
longer receiving the support needed to sustain operations—ISI was able to fill that void. 
Additionally, adopting principles from well-established strategists along with recognizing 
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the implications of past mistakes shaped the organization’s thinking and forced its leaders 
to moderate its decision-making toward targets that would prove more productive for the 
organization as a whole. The rational strategic thinking that took place within the 
organization was driven by the individual leadership. The individual leadership of Abu 
Hamzah and Abu Umar were the key drivers in decision-making and behavior of ISI during 
this time period. 
Like any type of large organization seeking long term success, ISIS has followed a 
rational strategic approach. Its willingness to adapt and modify its doctrine and strategy in 
order to meet its objective makes this group comparable to military organizations that 
continuously modify their strategy or doctrine based on the evaluation of lessons learned 
and making adjustments for what the time and situation calls for. Although its foundation 
and objective were religiously inspired, there are many indicators that demonstrate this 
group’s legal-rational thinking that more heavily influenced its decision-making rather than 
a solely ideologically or religiously driven organization. This willingness to make 
adjustments in the group’s grand strategy demonstrates the organization’s willingness to 
modify their doctrine in order to achieve the ultimate objective and was a key driver in how 
the organization makes decisions. 
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IV. THE CALIPHATE ERA (2013-PRESENT) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the time period after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over as 
emir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), later to become the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(ISIS), and his efforts toward establishing the caliphate. Throughout this period, it was 
apparent that the increase in brutality was more of a priority than leveraging support from 
the population and local tribes. The organization had already consolidated its base in Iraq 
and brought several other Sunni insurgent groups and tribesmen into their fold, which 
decreased the amount of opposition and limited the need for leveraging support from these 
local groups. The instrumental use of violence took priority over the need to gain local 
support, and was embedded in the organization’s strategy. After analyzing all three themes, 
the apocalyptic ideology of the group played a greater role in co-opting foreign fighters 
and recruits to the organization throughout this era. As the organization continued to grow 
it also grew the apocalyptic narrative that defined the necessity of a caliphate and gave a 
certain level of fulfillment to the cause. While apocalypticism was influential in the 
behavior and decision-making at the individual level – to include foreign fighters and local 
recruits joining ISIS – it does not appear that apocalyptic ideology was a key driver in the 
organization’s strategic decision-making and behavior. Furthermore, the organization’s 
rational strategic approach in carrying out its strategy with an absolute idea of the 
organization’s endstate. The ability to adapt and make changes to its doctrine and strategy 
while also remaining true to the organization’s objective is a reflection of the organization’s 
rational style thinking.  
 After another leadership transition took place in 2010 the organization saw a 
gradual change in the implementation of its organizational strategy. It continued the 
rational strategic approach that began with Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar but then gradually 
adopted a more absolutist strategy, similar to that favored by Zarqawi. This absolute way 
of thinking originated with Zarqawi’s narrow definition of a “true Muslim” and a broad 
declaration of apostates. By 2014 the organization dialed up the level of brutality against a 
broad range of enemies, similar to its initial brutality in 2004, but this time they had more 
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resources and wisdom learned from past mistakes to aid them. After a period of growth 
and expansion the organization gained enough resources and leveraged enough strength to 
the point where they did not need to make concessions in order to survive. There was less 
of a need for adaptation in order to leverage support —as seen in the previous era—
therefore, gaining local support from the population was not a large priority for the 
organization. Brutal displays of violence as means to coerce and intimidate were more 
common during this era than under Abu Umar and Abu Hamzah’s leadership. 
Another prominent theme during this era is the impact of individual leadership 
throughout the organization, especially the clashes that take place among top level leaders 
of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Jabat al-Nusra (JaN). Several clashes of personalities took place 
with disagreements on the appropriate way to continue to build networks relationships with 
fellow Sunni militants while also preserving the organization’s absolutist ideology.117 The 
differences between the individual leaders Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Muhammad al-
Jawlani, and Ayman al-Zawahiri were a prominent factor in the decisions made for each 
organization and the direction each group decided to go in. Each individual leader had his 
own vision of how ISIS should operate and collaborate with other Sunni militant groups. 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was less amenable to modifying his brutally violent strategy and he 
was unwilling to take any advice from Ayman al-Zawahiri—emir of al-Qaeda Central since 
bin Laden’s death—or Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani—founder of Jabat al-Nusra.118 Abu 
Bakr’s individual personality not only affected his ability to collaborate with other 
organizations and their leaders but it was also a factor in the execution of the organization’s 
strategy. 
According to documents written by jihadists analyzing the organization’s strategy, 
it was clear that the authors had recognized mistakes made in the past and provided 
recommendations based on proclaimed military strategists. An influential jihadi strategist, 
and former al-Qaeda member, Abu Musab al-Suri argued in Lessons Learned from the 
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Jihad Ordeal in Syria, that “the mujahidin in the 1980s did not have a comprehensive 
strategy and were ‘spread among numerous organizations,’ leading to ‘friction, hatred, and 
partisan bickering.’”119 Al-Suri highlighted the need for one common strategy and the 
need for a unity of effort in this statement which was later articulated in other strategic 
jihadi documents.120 Another document written by an ISI member was an example of 
rational analysis of ISI’s campaign that highlighted specific cases in which mistakes made 
within the organization as well as its impact to the organization’s strategy. The document 
also laid out steps to improve the organization’s military operations going forward.121 
Another captured jihadist document produced in 2009 provided an overall strategic plan 
for the organization to follow in order to establish the caliphate by forging a unity of effort, 
having more precisely measured military planning, creating an alternative to the 
Awakening Council, establishing the importance of political symbols, and treading 
carefully with the opposition in order to avoid repeating mistakes.122 These documents 
were in addition to the seven stage master plan drafted by Zarqawi and Sayf al-Adl which 
provided a roadmap for establishing the caliphate, however there has been no direct link 
made between the two manifestos.123 These writers appeared to have adopted the strategies 
of proclaimed military strategists such as Sun Tzu, Mao, and Clausewitz as many pieces 
of their doctrine reflect their teachings. Furthermore, the Management of Savagery 
manifesto written under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji and circulated since 2004 provided 
explanation and justification for the implementation of excessive violence which will 
ultimately lead to the desired Islamic caliphate.124 There is no specific indication that Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi had read this manifesto or any others. These documents were never 
explicitly referred to in any of the uncovered correspondence between ISIS leaders utilized 
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in this research, however, based on the similarity between priorities of ISIS leadership, the 
contents of these documents, and the actions of the organization which parallel the 
teachings of these documents, it is likely that these were at least somewhat influential in 
shaping the leadership’s decisions.  
ISIS was driven by the strategies outlined by educated leaders and implemented the 
use of brutal violence in their strategy as not only a means to an end, but as part of the end-
state. By learning from these past leaders, ISIS was able to recognize when a moderation 
in violence was necessary (as reflected upon in the previous chapter) as opposed to the 
need for “performance violence” to create a theater of terror to instill fear and establish a 
level of dominance for the organization.125 This type of messaging through the use of 
brutal violence was seen during Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s reign after the organization had 
gained enough strength and resources throughout the re-building phase which allowed 
them enough strength to withstand any local opposition that they might encounter.  
B. POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT 
The chaos and disorder that took root in Syria after the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings 
allowed ISI to expand and eventually declare itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(ISIS). The civil war within Syria created the perfect opportunity for the growing terrorist 
organization to take a stronghold in the predominantly Sunni country. In 2011, Abu 
Muhammad al-Jawlani was sent to Syria by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to grow a jihadi 
network in Syria in order to eventually expand and declare the caliphate.126 Jawlani 
established Jabat al-Nusra and it continued to gain strength in Syria, however, in 2013 
when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi planned to unite the two groups and declare the Islamic State 
in Iraq and al-Sham, Jawlani refused. This created further divergence within the large jihadi 
network, yet ISIS continued to grow as its own organization.127  
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In 2014 the Iraqi army was weaker than many believed in terms of force numbers, 
weapons, discipline, and even politics. These armed forces were unable to contain the 
threat of a rapidly growing terrorist organization such as ISIS.128 At this time there were 
no U.S. or coalition forces to take back the city of Fallujah as they had done in 2004, with 
weapons systems in need of repair and limited ammunition to support a long-term 
campaign.129 Adding to the instability of were the political challenges within the Iraqi 
army. Political appointments to the senior officer corps led to a level of distrust between 
enlisted soldiers and commanders. There were stronger elements of the Iraqi army were 
but were believed to be “sectarian hit squads” as they were predominantly Shia.130 These 
challenges did not place the Iraqi army as an effective security force to control, contain, or 
even limit the forces of ISIS from taking over major Iraqi cities. 
Eventually dormant Sunni insurgent groups, such as the Islamic Army of Iraq, 
Ansar al-Sunnah, and the Mujahidin Army, which had previously fought against ISIS re-
emerged and joined forces with the organization as a result of their frustration with the 
government.131 Some could argue that the sectarian polarization that Zarqawi sought was 
finally taking root, resulting in more Sunni jihadists co-opted to fight against the Iraqi 
government. After enough attacks by the predominantly Shia government, local Sunnis 
were taking up arms against the government on a sectarian premise.132 This sectarian 
divide allowed leaders of armed opposition groups to take advantage of the weakened 
country’s “fragile body politic.”133 Baghdadi proclaimed ISIS as the “sole defender” of 
the Sunni community to combat against the exclusion and persecution of the Shia-dominant 
regime in Baghdad and the Alawite-led regime in Damascus.134 ISIS declared the Islamic 
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State and the establishment of the caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph – and 
there was no one large enough to stop this organization. All of this was in keeping with al-
Adl’s master plan. The weakened Iraqi government and armed forces limited the amount 
of opposition ISIS would face and allowed the group to continue to grow. 
C. KEY LEADERS IN DECISION-MAKING 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared the emir of ISI in May 2010, three weeks after 
the deaths of Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi.135 Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi was from the predominantly Shia city of Samarra. His father was a prominent 
figure in the Albu Badri tribe and an imam at the local mosque.136 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
joined the Muslim Brotherhood while in graduate school and was later imprisoned in 2004 
at Camp Bucca. During his time at Camp Bucca he was able to build relationships and 
networks that would continue to grow even after his imprisonment as this prison became 
somewhat of a terrorist education center.137 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi impressed other jihadi 
prisoners with his knowledge and education of Islam, given his PhD in Islamic studies, and 
even began moderating and settling disputes – ultimately earning respect of a lot of 
prisoners.138 There is limited literature available on Abu Bakr that analyzes the impact of 
his previous education coupled with his experiences in prison—particularly in comparison 
to that of Zarqawi. It would be of interest to see if Abu Bakr’s time in prison had any impact 
on hardening his personality, similar to the brutal personal transformation that Zarqawi had 
undergone. After Abu Bakr’s release, he became emir of a small, sectarian group and 
eventually became Zarqawi’s ally around January 2006.139 Abu Bakr has been referred to 
                                                 
135 Fishman, The Master Plan, 153. 
136 Fishman. 
137 Martin Chulov, “ISIS: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014. 
138 Martin Chulov. 
139 Fishman, The Master Plan, 151. 
51 
as a Zarqawiist as he also aimed to “purge the world of the ‘apostates’”140 and believed 
“power and authority flowed from engagement on the battlefield.”141 
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani was a Syrian who joined Zarqawi’s movement before 
2003, left Iraq after Zarqawi’s death, then returned to Iraq after doing a stint in Lebanon. 
Similar to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Jawlani was also imprisoned at Camp Bucca where he 
supposedly taught classical Arabic to other prisoners in 2008.142 Upon his release from 
prison, Jawlani served with ISI in Mosul alongside Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi until he was sent 
to Syria in 2011. He became the emir of the group Jabat al-Nusra (JaN) but refused to align 
with Abu Bakr in order to establish the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. Based on the 
dialogue between Abu Bakr, Jawlani, and Zawahiri, it seemed as though their personalities, 
leadership philosophies, and their perception of their own authority within the jihadi 
network were all different. Jawlani swore allegiance to al-Qaeda Central and viewed 
authority as coming from Zawahiri while Abu Bakr attempted to assert his own control and 
did not view Zawahiri as his or ISI’s ultimate authority and did not seek anyone’s 
permission when declaring the group as ISIS. Jawlani acted more as a student of bin Laden 
by aiming to “win over other militants” and began building relationships and networks in 
Syria rather than seeking to purge the population of apostates.143 Contrastingly, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi’s leadership seemed to be somewhat of a blend between the populist Zarqawi 
ideology and some of the legal-rational style leadership of Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar.  
D. STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 
1. Application of Violence 
The organization’s strategic thinking is what drove its application of violence and 
subsequent target selection. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi continued Zarqawi’s vision of 
establishing the caliphate through the strategic use of brutal violence in which his reign of 
                                                 
140 Fishman, 170. 
141 Fishman, 173. 
142 Fishman, 168. 
143 Fishman, 170. 
52 
terror exceeded that of Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar and may even exceed that of Zarqawi. 
In 2014, the organization’s brutality and lethality against other jihadis, tribal groups, and 
individual leaders substantially increased and was demonstrated publically.144 ISIS 
“enforced [its] grandiose vision of supposed religious and political authority over every 
Muslim on earth…..by brutally killing anyone in its way…”145  
A demonstration of their application of violence and target selection was stated in 
the organization’s series “Clanging of the Swords” ISI stated in 2012 they would “hunt 
down and kill members of the Iraqi security forces and Sunni collaborators, but members 
of the police and Awakening who ‘repent would be welcomed back into the Islamic 
State.”146 This was a more aggressive message than Abu Hamzah’s message in 2006 when 
he first mentioned granting amnesty to those tribesmen who once fought against AQI, 
however, this message states the organization’s willingness to actively seek out and 
eliminate their enemies while also seeking to leverage these groups as potential recruits. 
For instance in 2014 ISIS massacred hundreds of members of one of the tribes that had 
previously opposed the organization during the Awakening in 2007.147 The targeting of 
this group was likely a means of long awaiting retaliation from the impact it felt during the 
Awakening as well as an opportunity for strategic messaging. This act of revenge likely 
lined up with the precise opportunity to remove a previous threat, avoid a future enemy to 
engage, and broadcast this massacre publically as a way of demonstrating its lethality. In 
September 2013, ISIS fighters killed JaN’s local emir, Sa’ad al-Hadrami, in Raqqah who 
had previously supported Abu Bakr, even after JaN’s split with ISIS, yet when al-Hadrami 
backed Zawahiri’s declaration of JaN as al-Qaeda in Syria he became an enemy.148 This 
change of allegiance by al-Hadrami was likely viewed as a betrayal to ISIS, making his 
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murder a vengeful assassination and another means of messaging to demonstrate the 
organization’s power and willingness to kill anyone who does not align with them. 
Additionally, the group’s public beheadings of individuals such as the American 
journalist Steven Sotloff, among many others, is another example of the group’s 
performance violence. Creating a theater of terror with broadcasted beheadings, death by 
burning alive, mass assassinations of groups of people, and public displays of gruesome 
punishment are all part of a strategic plan. According to Martha Crenshaw, acts of violence/
terrorism are usually the result of an internal logic within the organization.149 Rational 
thinkers make decisions based on means-ends thinking while also taking into consideration 
a limited number of options and also understanding the impact of their decisions.150 
Strategic thinking and rational decision making may not always be understood when 
combined with a terrorist group’s desire to demonstrate power through dramatic acts of 
violence, however, ISIS has demonstrated a certain level of calculation in order to ensure 
its means reach the ultimate end-state.151 The organization’s strategic thinking is what 
drives this type of behavior as it seeks to establish itself as an Islamic state and carry out 
its version of Sharia law.  
The Zarqawiist ideology which emphasizes that “power and authority flowed from 
engagement on the battlefield,” as Fishman describes, was becoming more prominent 
during Abu Bakr’s reign as emir.152 Zarqawiism is described as a “dystopian cultural 
movement wrapped around a core set of ideological principles,” according to Fishaman.153 
Throughout this era there are many instances of vengeful and malicious attacks with greater 
lethality and more indiscriminate targets. There were many instances of calculated targets 
–even the drastic increase in lethality of attacks and overall brutality appeared to be 
intentional and calculated. As the group continued to gain strength in resources and forces, 
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it turned up the dial on lethality of attacks. Almost as a means of meeting the defining 
characteristics of a state, ISIS attempted to gain a monopolization of the use of force.154 
Once the organization had built up enough layers of leadership, administration and 
bureaucracy in order to maintain itself as a somewhat functional organization it was better 
positioned to implement the brutal use of violence since they were confident that there were 
very few, if any, who could oppose them.155 This era drove a more vengeful, terror-focused 
strategy of savagery that would demonstrate the organization’s credibility and dominance 
and instill enough fear in order to reduce potential adversaries. This again supports the 
argument of this organization acting as rational strategists. They sought to minimize their 
enemies, reduce the number of groups and individuals fighting against them, continued to 
consolidate their base and expand while establishing themselves as a growing, credible 
threat through the use of excessive violence and brutality. This increased level of lethality 
allowed ISIS to coerce and intimidate groups into joining with them in order to consolidate 
their base, continue to gain strength and resources, and further expand its territory. 
2. Attempts to Gain Support 
With ISIS having a wide net of targets and the organization’s more indiscriminate 
target selection, there seemed to be less of the principal-agent problem that was seen in the 
previous era in which junior officers were found using excessive violence that were not in 
keeping with the organization’s strategy at the time. Even though this organization still 
faced other common organizational dilemmas, such as communication and security 
tradeoffs, its use of violence did not create as many internal issues as seen in the previous 
era—or at least limited documentation is available to reflect this. Furthermore, since the 
organization was more interested in creating fear among the population rather than winning 
over its support there were fewer limitations from top-level leadership that would make a 
strict distinction between a justified or unjustified killing since this standard was so low for 
a justified killing. During this era, ISIS prioritized the imposition of hudud legal 
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punishments156 over providing services or trying to win over the hearts and minds of the 
population. While implementing the hudud punishments ISIS used a public display of 
disturbing bloody punishments that acted as a deterrent for further violation of Islamic law. 
ISIS justified its use of force and punishment through Quranic scriptures, and based on 
their level of control with the use of force there was no state security or local security to 
protect the population from this implementation of terror. According to the uncovered 
administrative documents by Ayman al-Tammimi, ISIS began its attempt at governance by 
establishing ordinances based on Islamic law. ISIS created a threat, then offers protection 
against it, similar to any state’s attempt at monopolizing the use of force.157  
ISIS had not prioritized winning over the support of the population but was more 
focused on establishing its authority and exerting its control over territory. ISIS began to 
implement its form of governance and created administrative documents designed to 
outline and enforce their version of Sharia law, while the population struggled to meet the 
needs of daily life. Farmers struggled to grow and gather wheat from land ISIS had 
overtaken. Access to resources such as electricity and clean water were limited. ISIS 
realized that support from the population was important for success and eventually focused 
on providing the population with the necessary resources but was more concerned with 
creating a just and obedient society. There do not appear to be any indicators of the 
organization changing its strategy as a whole in order to meet the needs of the population. 
It is likely that gaining support from the local population was not the key driver in the 
organization’s behavior and decision making.  
3. Apocalypticism 
The role of apocalyptic ideology in the organization’s behavior and decision-
making throughout this period is somewhat ambiguous and contradicting in itself. At the 
individual level, apocalyptic fervor appeared to be a key driver in recruitment and foreign 
fighters seeking to join the organization. At the organizational level, however, 
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apocalypticism did not appear to be at the forefront of strategic decision-making and 
ultimate behavior. Similar to the previous eras, apocalypticism was predominant in the 
group’s propaganda and messaging but was contradicted in its collaboration with groups 
that were less indoctrinated with the religion. As mentioned in previous chapters, having 
in-depth knowledge of Quranic scriptures was not a requirement to be as ISIS fighter. There 
is little insight as to whether or not Abu Bakr actually believed in the apocalyptic ideology, 
however, the use of an Islamic narrative that would justify an urgent need to establish the 
caliphate seems to be an effective instrument in appealing to the masses. It appears as 
though, the apocalyptic narrative was used in order to justify the organization’s cause and 
ultimate reason for existence.  
The most significant demonstration of apocalypticism was when ISIS fighters 
captured the town of Dabiq, Syria because of its significance in the End of Times 
prophecies. Taking the town of Dabiq was not militarily significant, which would not 
appear to be a smart decision strategically. The town’s prophetic significance, however, 
did lend legitimacy to the organization’s cause and furthered the use of the Islamic 
apocalyptic narrative. It is uncertain if this was a true apocalyptic belief embedded in the 
minds of the terrorist group fighters and leadership, or if this was an attempt at a symbolic 
target that the organization failed to retain. Zarqawi and Abu Umar mentioned the prophecy 
of Dabiq in public statements made but it is unclear if these are genuine beliefs or a means 
to rally support and inspire motivation. There was no indication that any sort of order or 
direction from top level leadership outlined the significance of Dabiq as part of the 
apocalypse or even its significance to the organization’s end-state. Furthermore, the 
fighters’ drastic retreat from the city rather than fighting to the death in an effort to defend 
the city and defeat the Free Syrian Army that came in to re-capture the city is one indication 
that this group does not hold a strong apocalyptic ideology as a key driver of their decision 
making. Additionally, the group made the rational decision to withdraw after facing an 
enemy they were unable to defeat, which superseded any sort of religious apocalyptic 
fervor. The End of Times rhetoric promulgated by ISIS appeared to be instrumental in its 
propaganda and recruitment and was primarily a messaging tool for the organization to 
attract recruits, continue to implement its strategic use of violence in order to gain more 
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territory, enforce its version of governance, and meet its objective of establishing the 
caliphate. 
E. CONCLUSION 
ISIS’ behavior and decision-making during this era was largely driven by the 
organization’s top level leadership, rational-strategic approach to thinking, the use of 
strategic jihadist documents, and especially the instrumental use of violence embedded 
within the organization’s strategy. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was markedly different than 
Zarqawi but eventually demonstrated many similarities in the broad target selections and 
the increased level of lethality used against targets. The chaos and disorder in the region at 
the time allowed for organizations like ISIS and JaN to take a foothold in areas in which 
the government security forces were weak and were not match for these large, brutal 
organizations. Taking advantage of such an opportunity and following the guidance set 
forth by several jihadist strategists appears to be more of a calculated move rather than a 
spontaneous, religiously-inspired motivation. This organization had an objective, learned 
from past mistakes in previous eras, continued to weaken governments and organizations 
that would try to oppose them, continued to gain strength and resources until it became 
stronger than any opposition in its path. These were all achieved by taking a rational-
strategic approach led by a legal-rational style leader.  
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V. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis asked: what factors motivate the behavior and decision-making of ISIS; 
what consistencies or inconsistencies lie in the organization’s doctrine, strategy, and 
ideology; and, under what conditions is ISIS willing to modify its religious or political 
doctrine in order to achieve its ultimate objective? Three hypotheses were tested in order 
to answer these questions 1) Violence is a vital component to the organization’s strategy. 
It has played a significant role and remained a consistent factor its behavior and decision-
making; 2) Support from the local population and local tribes will be vital for ISIS to 
achieve its objective. Any amendments made to the group’s doctrine or compromises made 
in the interest of gaining support will demonstrate its significance in influencing ISIS’ 
behavior and decision-making; 3) Apocalyptic ideology is a core part of the organization’s 
leadership’s belief system among the organization’s leaders, and will remain a consistent 
justification used for achieving the objective of a united caliphate. 
This chapter explains and summarizes the research of this thesis, compares and 
contrasts the evolutional eras of ISIS’ existence, analyzes the three hypotheses being tested, 
and presents overall findings. This thesis argues that ISIS is willing to modify its doctrine 
in order to achieve its ultimate objective based on the organization’s inconsistencies found 
within each hypothesis tested and its willingness to modify its use of violence as well as 
its relations with other Sunni groups. Apocalyptic ideology, however, remained a 
consistent theme throughout the group’s evolution as a consistent aspect of messaging and 
propaganda but was not a key driver of behavior and strategic decision-making.  
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
Chapter I presented the research question of this thesis and examined a variety of 
existing literature on terrorism, terrorist organization, the evolution of ISIS as an 
organization, ways to define ISIS, and Islamic apocalypticism. Chapter II explored the era 
from 2000–2006 which demonstrated the significance of Zarqawi’s influence on the 
evolution of AQI, later to become ISIS. Zarqawi’s grand strategy, which was likely 
influenced heavily by his extreme personality, emphasized excessive brutality, and 
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maximizing opportunities created by the political security environment of Iraq at the time. 
Similarly, Chapter III explores the era from 2007–2013 which is heavily influenced by Abu 
Hamzah and Abu Umar and demonstrates a shift in the organization’s priorities and overall 
strategy. The level of extreme brutality was curbed by the necessity of building relations 
with local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups in order to ensure survival and limit 
opposition. This shift in behavior in balancing the level of violence with the integration of 
other local groups demonstrates the group’s willingness to compromise and adapt to certain 
degrees. Chapter IV explores the final era of ISIS which takes place from 2014-present. 
This era is heavily influenced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who takes over in 2010 and 
continues to grow and expand the organization while also increasing the level of brutality.  
B. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE HYPOTHESES 
Among the three themes researched there appears to be a delicate balance between 
the utilization of excessive violence as part of the organizational strategy, local support, 
and the ideological belief of apocalypticism. The way in which the organization balanced 
the use of violence with gaining enough support from other local Sunni tribes and insurgent 
groups was likely an effort made to grow strength in numbers but also to limit the amount 
of opposition they faced. Balancing violence, support, and ideology changed throughout 
various leadership transitions and throughout the group’s evolution, which demonstrates 
the adaptability of the organization. That is, rather than remaining consistent in its use of 
excessive violence, and brutality ISIS is willing to make amendments to its doctrine after 
facing significant opposition and recognizing a variety of lessons learned. Additionally, the 
organization managed the apocalyptic ideology as part of its overall messaging and 
justification for the objective, but there were still limits to how much this ideological belief 
was actually inherent in decision-making. 
C. FINDINGS 
In comparing the different eras since Zarqawi, there appear to be other factors that 
were more significant drivers of decision-making that help explain certain inconsistencies 
in the organization’s behavior. Three other factors remained prevalent throughout and 
somewhat explain the variation in violence, leveraging support, and apocalypticism. These 
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three factors include 1) the ideologically-driven objective of establishing the caliphate, 2) 
the rational approach to implementing and executing the organizational strategy, and 3) the 
leadership transitions that took place as well as the characteristics of the different leaders. 
The organization’s objective appears to have deep roots within the ideology in which its 
leaders were unwilling to make any sort of compromise on the end state. The strategy 
implementation did appear to be more of a rational strategic approach based on the rational 
actor model.158 Finally, the change in leadership—i.e., from Zarqawi to Abu Hamzah and 
Abu Umar to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—that took place within the organization impacted the 
decision-making and behavior of the group, not only due to the different personality 
characteristics of each individual leader, but also the transitions itself were significant 
inflection points in the organization’s evolution. 
1. The Ideological Objective 
The objective of establishing the caliphate remained consistent throughout the 
organization over time. The leaders of ISIS had a clearly defined idea of what the 
organization was seeking to achieve and were unwilling to make compromises on what the 
caliphate would look like. There were various disagreements on the implementation of 
sharia law within the caliphate, but the overall strategic end-state remained consistent. As 
stated in previous chapters, the leaders of ISIS and al-Qaeda Central did not view any 
Muslim-majority state as a legitimate government. Even Saudi Arabia which operated 
under strict sharia law did not meet their clear definition of what the caliphate should look 
like. Some of the desire to establish an Islamic state was fueled by hatred and vengeance 
against other governments but many Salafi-jihadists truly believed that no current form of 
governance as legitimate if it does not follow God’s prescribed law.159 The belief that 
sovereignty belongs to God and that any state system that is governed by the people 
rewards condemnation and is rejected by many jihadis.160 
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Furthermore, the group was unwilling to modify its objective in order to accept 
anything less than a united caliphate. There was no moderate interpretation or view of this 
objective or what it would look like in terms of power and control. This became a greater 
issue when Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani began to develop a stronghold in Syria and began 
making compromises with other militant leaders rather than bringing them into the Islamic 
State fold.161 Jawlani’s relations with militant leaders differed from ISI’s dealings with 
other Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq after the Awakening Councils, which only gave these 
organizations the option to join ranks with ISI rather than maintain their own group’s 
identity.162 A certain amount of absolutism and unwillingness to compromise elements of 
unification was necessary and significant in achieving the long-term objective of one united 
caliphate. 
Based on the consistency of this objective and the organization’s unwillingness to 
compromise its idea of the power the caliphate should have, it is likely that this objective 
was more than purely a self-interested goal for power, money, or control. Although it is 
possible that some key individual leaders may have been interested in power and control, 
it is unlikely to be the main motivator. That is, if this concept were purely individually 
driven, after facing the significant backlash from the Awakening Council, the constant 
opposition from other Sunni insurgent groups and local tribes, and the bombings from U.S. 
and coalition forces would likely have attrited the group’s willingness to continue fighting; 
yet this organization bounced back and kept moving forward. Establishing the caliphate 
was not an objective that was easily given up on and forgotten and was likely a true belief 
in the minds of these leaders. Since the foundation of their objective was ideologically 
driven and held so much strength, the organization was interested in its own survival and 
dedicated to its objective. ISIS would go to great lengths to achieve this objective rather 
than admitting defeat and walking away.  
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2. The Rational Actor 
Although having an objective that is driven by an extreme or radical ideology is not 
typically associated with rational actors, the strategy designed to establish the caliphate 
appeared to be implemented through a rational approach. Although the rational decision-
making varied based on the individual, the rational-strategic approach was commonly 
recognized under each key leader. The leaders of the organization recognized mistakes that 
other jihadist organizations had made in the past and incorporated lessons learned into an 
evolving strategy. For instance, Zarqawi emphasized the use of violence against the Shia 
population, rather than the U.S. and focused target selection against the Iraqi government 
and security forces as they were viewed as predominantly Shia.163 Zarqawi recognized the 
limited timeline of U.S. occupation in Iraq and the long-term implications of the 
predominance of Shia in Iraq’s political environment.164 This specific targeting of Shia 
did not appear to be part of any deep-seeded hatred of Shia people but rather a long-term 
strategic outlook of the power struggle that would take place. Zarqawi believed if he 
weakened this opponent enough it would create the environment necessary to establish the 
caliphate.  
Zarqawi and his fellow leaders also took advantage of the opportunities created at 
the time by utilizing apocalyptic messaging as an explanation for such chaos and disarray. 
This was an effective way to appeal to the masses by leveraging an Islamic narrative that 
Muslims are already familiar with and associating it with the unexplainable phenomenon 
going on at the time. The instrumental use of an ideological belief fits into the strategic-
rational approach this organization consistently took. There were situations, however, in 
which Zarqawi and other leaders acted out of vengeance or retaliation, but that was not 
what the organization’s overall strategy was based on. In fact, Zarqawi’s coordinated 
attacks on the hotels in Jordan, which was likely an act of vengeance and arguably his 
biggest blunder as AQI leader, did not fit the rational strategic approach and was even 
condemned by fellow al-Qaeda Central leadership, and especially a number of Jordanian 
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tribes and insurgent groups.165 Overall, AQI focused its efforts on strategic target selection 
that would create an ideal environment for the establishment of the caliphate. 
The transition of leadership to Abu Hamzah, Abu Umar, and later Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi shifted from Zarqawi’s charismatic archetype to a more legal-rational approach 
in which the organization’s strategy evolved and changed over time.166 This group 
highlighted specific examples of errors made in their own use of violence and 
indiscriminate targeting and the impact to the organization’s strategy and objectives, then 
made changes to its own strategy and implementation of violence. This ability to adapt to 
the situation and change course, rather than stubbornly staying committed to its original 
doctrine of excessive violence, demonstrates a realistic rational approach to their behavior. 
By making a conscious decision to limit the level of brutal violence in order to establish 
partnerships, grow the organization, and limit the amount of opposition demonstrates the 
organization’s willingness to compromise aspects of its doctrine for its own survival. The 
organization recognized the implications of using excessive brutality and adjusted its 
strategy accordingly. This is not to say that ISI completely changed its doctrine or 
abandoned extreme brutality, but the organization attempted to be more precise and 
calculated in its target selection rather than using indiscriminate lethality.  
Furthermore, ISI’s approach to its relations with local tribes and other insurgent 
groups was also likely driven by the recognized advantage ISI would have by working with 
these groups rather than fighting them. The cost-benefit analysis that led to a shift in the 
organization’s relations with these groups is a reflection of ISI’s strategic rational 
approach.167 As the effects of the Awakening Council eventually dwindled down, ISI took 
advantage of the previously U.S.-supported Sahwa forces that were left with little resources 
and little support from the Iraqi government. ISI strategically brought these groups and 
people into its fold and rather than hold bitterness, hatred, or even a desire for vengeance 
against these groups that had previously fought against them. ISI leaders saw a greater 
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benefit to partnering with these groups and leveraging their strength and support than 
continuing to fight against them, which is another demonstration of the rational actor 
model. Prioritizing the benefits of partnership rather than maintaining an adversarial 
relationship demonstrates that the group recognizes cost-benefit analysis to a certain 
degree, which fits the rational actor model.168  
ISI also capitalized on the political grievances created by the Iraqi government as 
well as the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Syria. Both of these opportunities allowed ISI to 
expand and eventually declare itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This 
group recognized opportunities to take advantage of, continued to gain strength, learned 
from their own mistakes and the mistakes of jihadists in the past, and then modified their 
doctrine to create a reliable strategy. ISIS gained enough strength that with the weaknesses 
of the Iraqi security forces and the Syrian civil war ongoing, that it was able to seize control 
and more widely implement its form of governance. Some may attribute much of the 
organization’s success to luck of the political and security situation at the time, however, 
it is more apparent that these decisions were made with the long-term objective in mind 
and even with a dynamic operating environment this organization was able to follow the 
strategy outlined and adapt as necessary.  
3. The Leadership Transition 
The influence of individual key leaders of ISIS and the transition between them 
allowed for a variation in personality characteristics, individual motivations, and leadership 
approaches that allowed the organization to continue to grow and progress rather than 
stagnate. The organization began with the charismatic leadership of Zarqawi who was 
innovative, passionate, strong, and authoritative. Zarqawi recognized a new strategic 
approach to establish the caliphate that was different than the approach that other AQ 
leaders and strategists had taken to achieve this objective and was more absolute in his 
approach. Zarqawi emphasized that the necessity of allegiance to Islam comes from the 
battlefield, which fed into his narrow definition of a true Muslim, and anyone who fell 
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outside of that was declared an apostate and their death would be justified. Zarqawi created 
this extreme culture of purging the world of apostates, which he justified through Islamic 
texts and historical precedence. He shaped the thinking of his junior leaders but also created 
some dissent with senior AQ Central leadership because of his extreme strategic approach. 
Zarqawi’s strong character, authoritative presence, and extreme personality allowed him 
to create a mass following of people who supported his extreme approach but also created 
a lot of enemies.  
Abu Hamzah continued the call for the extreme violence that Zarqawi had 
emphasized but Abu Hamzah made greater efforts to maintain relations with AQ leadership 
and other Sunni militant groups in Iraq. Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar showed more 
patience, adaptability, and even humility in recognizing the implications of maintaining 
Zarqawi’s extreme strategy of declaring much of the world apostates deserving death. This 
demonstrates the realist approach these leaders took, which contrasted from Zarqawi’s 
leadership. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also continued the legal-rational style leadership of his 
predecessors in order to grow and expand the organization’s span of control. As ISIS 
became stronger Abu Bakr was less willing to compromise and was more determined to 
establish superiority which involved an increase in brutality and extreme measures. The 
variation in leadership was influential in how the organization operated throughout 
different periods of their evolution.  
Although it is difficult to predict a counter-factual, but it is possible that if this 
leadership transition had not taken place, it may have taken the organization longer to 
recognize its own mistakes and make certain modifications to its strategy. Due to the 
change in leadership which added a new perspective with the organization’s decision 
making power. After Zarqawi’s death, Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar did not make drastic 
changes to the organization right away but also recognized certain areas that were in need 
of repair and gradually made distinct changes to the organizations. Similarly, when Abu 
Hamzah and Abu Umar were killed and were replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi he, too, 
continued the efforts of his predecessors but also offered a new perspective in the 
organization’s decision making. The target selection of the group gradually became more 
absolutist as the organization gained strength and expanded further. It is also difficult to 
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analyze whether or not Abu Hamzah and Abu Umar would have been able to continue the 
organization’s progression in such a way as Abu Bakr. The transition of leadership allowed 
for a fresh perspective that could more easily recognize what was not working well within 
the organization and what types of changes to implement. Each leader kept the overall 
objective in mind and had the support of a collective groups of leaders known as the Shura 
Council to make decisions, but the variation of leadership in power created an opportunity 
for a fresh and perhaps more critical perspective to be incorporated into the decision-
making process for the organization. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The balance between extreme violence and leveraging support, supported by a 
strong ideology was the determining factor in this organization’s successes and failures, 
which feeds directly into how the organization made its decisions and acted accordingly. 
The group’s use of extreme violence under Zarqawi’s rule was a strong kick start for the 
organization but was significantly impacted when local tribes and Sunni insurgent groups 
became fed up with this group’s attempt to exert control rather than make attempts to 
collaborate. The extreme measures of AQI eventually tipped the scale creating a significant 
opposition that the group was no prepared to defeat. After recognizing the group’s own 
limitations, it attempted to re-balance and offered forgiveness, made compromises, and 
became more discriminate in its targeting. The organization gained enough strength and 
resources to the point where they faced little opposition, took control of more territory, and 
increased its brutal measures; Yet, again, the group crossed the threshold of an “acceptable 
level of violence” and suffered an even greater backlash from international community.  
The underlying factors that drove the organization’s behavior and ability to balance 
and adapt began with the group’s stronghold on an objective that was ideologically driven. 
Establishing the caliphate was not to be compromised and its leaders truly subscribed to 
this belief that achieving this objective is necessary. The organization’s rational approach, 
utilization of famous military and jihadist strategist teachings, recognition of mistakes 
made, and the ability to adapt to the circumstances drove the strategic thinking and decision 
making of ISIS. Finally, the leadership transitions that allowed for unique perspectives, 
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which may not have otherwise been recognized if one single leader been responsible the 
entire time, shaped the way changes took place within the organization. All of these things 
were significantly influential in the organization’s behavior and decision-making process.  
E. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research for this thesis suggests that the key decision makers of large terrorist 
organization are not necessarily fanatical or irrational actors. The key leaders of ISIS took 
a rational strategic approach to reach a desired end state by clearly defining their objective, 
developing a coherent strategy based on lessons learned from past jihadists, and modifying 
their doctrine based on the political security situation at the time. The implementation of 
this organization’s strategy mirrored many aspects of U.S. military strategy 
implementation and followed examples of many great military strategists that are currently 
taught within the U.S. Department of Defense. Furthermore, the ideologically-driven 
objective and subsequent strategy that remained flexible and adaptable allowed an 
organization such as ISIS to grow significantly and achieve certain levels of success. This 
is something that is likely to be re-created given the strong desire of the objective. The fact 
that ISIS remained uncompromised in its objective but was willing to recognize its own 
mistakes and make appropriate changes and adaptations to its strategy demonstrates not 
only the strong desire to achieve the objective but also the significance of the objective 
itself. Organizations such as ISIS will likely continue to learn and grow over time by 
learning from past successes and failures in order to achieve such an ideologically-driven 
objective. 
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